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Samandrag 
Det er viktig å vite mest mogleg om den historiske utviklinga av inntektsulikskap for å få ei breiare 
forståing av ulikskap i vår tid. Studiar som viser korleis inntektsulikskap har utvikla seg over eit langt 
tidsrom er det få av. Men mange land har historisk informasjon om inntekt, skatt og sosialstøtte for 
grupper i folket som kan brukast som grunnlag for å talfesta mål for inntektsulikskap. Denne 
artikkelen presenterer nye metodar for å talfesta inntektsulikskap frå slike data, og brukar desse 
metodane på tilgjengelege norske inntekts- og sosialstøttedata frå 1875 til 2013. 
 
Basert på ein inntektsdefinisjon som er konsistent over tid gir vi ei øvre og nedre grense for ulikskap 
(målt ved Gini-koeffisienten) i fordelinga av markedsinntekt for kjernehushald (einslige og gifte par). I 
tråd med Toquevilles (1835) syn om høgre ulikskap i Europa enn i USA finn vi at Norge på 1800-talet 
ikkje var spesielt egalitært - inntektsulikskapen er vesentlig lægre i dag enn for 100 år sidan. 
Samstundes har det ikkje vore ein vedvarande nedgang i ulikskapen over tid; ulikskapen er stabil i 
nokre periodar, men fell og stig i andre. Den utviklar seg episodisk. Dette viser at utviklinga av 
ulikskap over tid ikkje kan forklarast ved enkle økonomiske teoriar, men heller som eit samspel av ei 
rekkje komplekse økonomiske krefter. 
4 
 
1 Introduction: Inequality in the long-run 
Few countries have data on income inequality providing information for the whole population 
covering a century or more in a continuous time series. The studies initiated by Piketty (2001) provide 
rich information but this is typically limited to the top income groups, as in the study of top incomes in 
Norway from 1875 by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010). Modern series covering the whole income 
distribution were rarely available until after the Second World War. The reason is evident. The main 
instrument used today to record the whole income distribution is the household survey, and such 
surveys only came into regular use at the national level in the latter part of the twentieth century.  
 
This means that there is only limited evidence about income inequality for years before 1945. The 
most widely-quoted Gini coefficients for the United States begin in 1929; the first in the modern series 
for the United Kingdom is for 1938 (see Atkinson and Morelli, 2014). While estimates certainly exist 
for earlier years, they are not comparable with modern series. For the United States, figures were 
given by Spahr for 1890 and by King for 1910 (see Merwin, 1939), but they are described by 
Williamson and Lindert as “eclectic size distribution guesses”, and they conclude that “it is better to 
pass over these” (1980, page 91). Williamson (1985) has given figures for the Gini coefficient for 
England and Wales, and Scotland, for years ranging from 1688 to 1915. Again, these are not readily 
linked to the modern series: they are shown in separate tables in the survey by Lindert (2000). There 
are very few countries that have a continuous series on income inequality back to the nineteenth 
century.1 
 
There is however considerable interest in viewing a continuous long-run series for overall income 
inequality. From Kuznets’ Presidential Address (1955) onwards, long-run changes in inequality have 
been the basis for the development of theories of structural change, and there has been much 
discussion as to whether inequality first rises and then falls with industrialization. If incomes today are 
indeed less unequal than in the past, when did inequality fall? Have there been distinct periods when 
inequality has fallen or risen? What was the impact of shocks such as the First and Second World 
Wars? What was the effect of the Great Depression? The 1930s is a period where we know little about 
the development of the income distribution. In the United States, there has been a large literature on 
                                                     
1Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) calculate a wide bound on the Gini coefficient for Denmark in 1875 and then from 1903 
onwards (though with some changes in data definitions over time). The longest existing series for income inequality in 
Norway were reported by Soltow (1965), who constructed a series of Gini coefficients based on samples of tax records. 
These are limited to eight Norwegian cities for selected years from 1850 to 1960. 
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the Great Depression, but “the role of income inequality before and during the Great Depression …has 
almost never been discussed thoroughly” (Belabed, 2016, Abstract). In the post-war period, are the 
recent changes in income inequality large or small in comparison with those in the past? Historical 
comparisons help place today’s inequality in perspective.  
 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate what can be said about the evolution of the overall income 
distribution in countries for which there are rich historical data. To this end, we present and explore a 
new series on the distribution of income in Norway as a whole spanning the period from 1875 to 2013. 
In constructing this series, we restrict attention to sources that provide information about the incomes 
of individuals and their families, where income is the total from all sources (earnings, investments and 
transfers) before deduction of tax, referred to here as “gross income”. The information may be quite 
limited, such as the number of people who are below a particular income level (for example, the tax 
threshold). But it implies that we do not use, for example, data on the distribution of people by 
occupational groups, attributing to them an average income or wage (often referred to as the “social 
tables” approach – see Lindert, 2000, page 174).  
 
Our starting point is the information provided by the detailed income tax tabulations of incomes by 
ranges as used by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) in their study of top income shares in Norway. In 
Section 2, we describe the tabulated data available from the published income tax records from 1875 
and in the form of micro-data from 1967. The tax information is a rich source, but it varies in form 
from year to year, and has to be used with caution for reasons explained in Section 2. It is also limited 
in coverage of the population, as it excludes non-taxpayers, who in the earlier years constituted the 
majority of the population. Using income tax data for periods when taxpayers were a minority may 
appear a triumph of hope over experience, but we show in the paper that overall inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient is governed very much by what happens to the top half of the 
distribution, and, as a consequence, the calculations are less sensitive to the assumptions made about 
the incomes of those in the lower half. 
 
The incomplete coverage of the population in the tax data means that there is a challenge in seeking to 
measure overall income inequality, as represented here by the Gini coefficient. This challenge we meet 
by creating “upper” and “lower” bounds on the Gini coefficient. These are not bounds in a 
mathematical sense. The Gini coefficient can, for example, be raised to 100 per cent by assuming that 
enough of the missing population has large negative incomes. Rather the bounds are based on 
judgments. These judgments are open to debate, and we explain in detail in Section 3 the assumptions 
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made here. They involve introducing information from sources beyond the detailed income tax 
tabulations by ranges. In particular, we bring to bear aggregate information from the municipal and 
central government tax records, which is available annually for a long period. The additional 
information, coupled with assumptions about the relative position of different groups, allows us both 
to say more about the years before the Second World War and to narrow the bounds on the estimated 
Gini coefficient. To this, we add a further source of evidence about incomes at the bottom of the scale: 
administrative data on the number of recipients of public assistance and the average amounts received. 
Since the additional sources may be available for other countries, this methodological discussion is of 
wider interest than the application in this paper to the case of Norway. 
 
In this way, the paper demonstrates that much can be learned from administrative data even in cases 
where individual observations are not available (such as in Norway before 1967). By combining 
tabulations from different sources, a more complete picture of the distribution than what one obtains 
from (state) tax records alone can be attained. Similar procedures can likely be applied to other 
countries to examine whether the development found here for Norway carries over to other 
institutional and geographical settings. 
 
The historical series is presented in Section 4, where we discuss the main features of the evolution of 
income inequality in Norway. Figure 1 provides a preview, showing the Gini coefficient since 1875 
(this is an “average” series based on a simple mean of the upper and lower bounds). On the basis of 
the results in Section 4, we attempt to answer a number of questions. There is the long-run question as 
to how inequality today compares with that a century or more ago. How does the present day Gini 
coefficient compare with those found before 1914? The second set of questions concerns how we got 
from there to here. Have there been distinct periods when inequality has fallen or risen? Was it all a 
war-time phenomenon? Figure 1 already suggests the beginnings of an answer to this question: 
wartime is not the only explanation. A third set of questions concerns the underlying causes of 
peacetime equalization. Has there been an “inequality turn” in recent decades? Where does that leave 
Norway today? 
 
In seeking to cover such a long period, we are constrained by the information contained in the 
available sources. As a result, the definition adopted here for the long-run series differs from the 
income distribution statistics produced today by Statistics Norway (website, “Income statistics for 
households”). Our series differs in three principal respects: (a) it relates to gross income including 
taxable transfers but before the subtraction of direct taxes, (b) family income is not adjusted for family 
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size, a tax unit being treated as a unity regardless of its composition, and (c) the unit of analysis is the 
inner family (defined as a single person, a couple, and any dependent children) rather than the 
household. Our choices reflect the constraints imposed by the material at our disposal, but there are 
intrinsic grounds for defending their use. From the standpoint of policy, there is now increasing 
concern about the determinants of gross incomes, in the face of the recognition of the limits to 
redistribution via taxation. As our results show, the Gini coefficient for gross incomes in Norway 
today is quite a lot higher than the disposable income figure that typically enters public discussion. 
Equally, the present-day focus on total household income is open to the objection that it assumes an 
unrealistic degree of income sharing within the household, where different family units may have 
different access to resources. And, finally, the need for equivalisation is lower in the case of inner 
family than for the more extensive household. This said, we recognize the interest in disposable 
income, and Section 5 shows the results – covering a shorter time period – for alternative definitions 
of income. 
 
Figure 1: Preview of result: Gini coefficient in Norway 1875 to 2013 (average of upper and lower bounds) 
 
 
In Section 6 we compare this series for Norway with the Gini coefficients for the same period for 
Denmark, and with the shorter period from 1918 for which overall inequality measures are available 
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for the United States. This comparison reveals a remarkable similarity in the movements of the two 
series for a long period: for some hundred years up to the mid-1970s.  
 
The main conclusions are summarized in Section 7. 
2 The income tax data in Norway 
We begin with a brief account of the Norwegian income tax data, and the way in which they can be 
used to produce results for the income distribution as a whole. This section is principally concerned 
with the years from 1875 up to 1951 when the published data are more fragmentary and vary in 
coverage. From 1952, the tabulations are more detailed, and from 1967 to the present we have access 
to micro-data. The income data originate directly from tax records (they are not inferred from taxes 
paid). This means that some sources of non-taxable welfare payments are not included. However, as 
the data for all income groups are obtained from official sources we expect the disconnect between 
observed and true income to be smaller than if one were to combine, say, average market wages with 
the distribution of occupations. Throughout the entire period, the same conceptual income definition is 
used, namely "alminnelig inntekt" (common income). This refers to income before tax, but after some 
pre-tax deductions.  
 
Self-employment income is accounted for by a assessments of the productive capacity of farms (in 
particular for smaller farms) and derivation from company accounts. In aggregate statistics for some 
time periods, incomes for companies (in addition to individuals) are included; where this is the case, 
we adjust the calculations to account for this.  
The income tax data from 1875 
The income tax sources are municipal (MUN) and central government (CG) tax assessments: 
Kommunenes skattelikning and Statsskattelikningen.2 The key feature here is that, for a number of 
years, the government has published tabulations of the distribution of income taxpayers by range of 
income. The sources are listed in Appendix B. As the MUN tax data are more extensive (tax 
thresholds are lower and there are more people paying MUN than CG tax), we assume that CG 
taxpayers are a subset of MUN taxpayers.  
                                                     
2 This information, and further information below, comes from Gerdrup (1998) and the Introduction to Part XIII of Historisk 
Statistikk (HS) 1968. 
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The coverage of these income tax tabulations varies over the period. The CG tax was introduced in 
1892, so that the prior years have only distributional information from the MUN tax. The published 
tabulations for 1892 to 1903 only relate to the CG tax, and the same applies to 1938 and 1948-1951. 
To summarize in decreasing order of completeness over the period up to 1951: 
(i) MUN and CG distributional data: 1906, 1913 and 1929; 
(ii) MUN distributional data: 1875 and 1888; 
(iii) CG distributional data: 1892-1903, 1938, 1948-1951. 
 
This may seem like lean pickings. However, we may supplement the distributional data with aggregate 
information on the total number of MUN taxpayers and their total income, which is available for 
nearly all years. This means that, in addition to the Lorenz curve from the distributional data, we have 
in the case (iii) a further point corresponding to the total MUN taxpayers (and hence total taxpayers).  
 
The tabulations of taxpayers by income ranges from 1952 to 1966, which precede the micro-data 
available from 1967, vary in their coverage (see Appendix B). Income is equal to assessed income by 
the municipal tax assessment for the years 1952-55. In the tabulations for the years 1957 to 1966, 
income is defined as assessed income by the central government tax assessment if central government 
tax is levied. If not, income is defined as assessed income by the municipal tax assessment. (There are 
no data for 1956 on account of the introduction of Pay-as-You Earn.) 
 
After 1967, all individual incomes are available on computer files at Statistics Norway. The income 
concept used is "alminnelig inntekt", income post some deductions, which is identical to the pre-1967 
tabulations. Using data from the Central Population Register, we merge married couples into single 
units, adding the income of husband and wife to form the inner family.  
Control totals 
In all years, the CG and MUN income tax tabulations cover only a fraction of the total population. In 
order to arrive at an estimate of income inequality across the entire population, rather than only among 
the taxpayers, the tax data have to be combined with independent estimates of the total number of tax 
units and the total of household income. The sources for these “control totals” are described in 
Appendix C. The first step in calculating total tax units is the adult population, defined here as those 
aged 16 and over. The second step is to subtract the number of married women. For total income, the 
starting point is a series for total household income provided for 1978 to 2013 by the National 
Accounts. Conceptually, total household income is made up of (i) compensation of employees (not 
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including employers’ social security contributions), (ii) operating surplus of self-employed businesses, 
(iii) property income, (iv) transfers from government and from abroad, and (v) income not elsewhere 
classified. In order to extrapolate this series backwards, we have made use of historical series that are 
as comparable as possible. As in the study of top incomes presented in Aaberge and Atkinson (2010), 
the control total is taken as a percentage (72 per cent) of the national accounts total household income, 
to allow for the more extensive coverage of the latter.3  
 
Figure 2: Mean income per tax unit (CPI adjusted) in 2013 NOK 
 
 
The control totals yield an estimate of the mean income per tax unit and this is expressed in Figure 2 in 
real terms (as 2013 NOK). Over the period since 1875, real income has risen by a factor of around 13.4 
But the growth has not been steady. Before 1914 there was an irregular pattern of growth and 
downturn. The inter-war period saw little improvement in real incomes. The post-Second World War 
period, in contrast, experienced rapid growth up to the mid-1970s, which later slowed and was 
                                                     
3 A comparison of the National Accounts control total to the internal total using only taxpayer data is given in Appendix C. 
4 GDP per capita (in fixed prices) has grown by a factor of 18 over the same period. The discrepancy largely comes from the 
large demographic changes over this period; Norway in 1875 had a much younger population. Total population grew by a 
factor of 2.8 from 1875 to 2013, while total tax units (as defined here) grew by a factor of 3.6. 
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interrupted by the banking crisis of 1988 to 1993. This macro-economic experience makes it all the 
more important to investigate what happened to the distribution of income.  
3 Bounds on the Gini coefficient 
We now move to an estimation of the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient based on the data on MUN 
and CG taxpayers as well as the control total. Given that the data are typically incomplete, we have to 
make assumptions and will work throughout with an upper and lower bound Gini coefficient. By 
consistently choosing assumptions that lead to higher inequality for the upper bound and lower 
inequality for the lower bound, we are able to efficiently bracket the true Gini coefficient that we 
would obtain if we had full information on the exact incomes of all core households and also to get a 
measure of the precision of our estimates.  
 
The discussion in this section will be based on the available Norwegian historical data sources. 
However, having several types of income tax as well as data on social assistance is by no means 
unique to Norway in this period. For this reason, the methods proposed here, utilizing tabular data to 
assess points on the Lorenz curve, should be applicable also to other countries.  
 
Different formats of the overall Lorenz curves are shown in Figure 3, which relates to the case where 
we have distributional information on MUN taxpayers (with or without information on CG taxpayers) 
and Figure 4, which relates to the case where we have only aggregate information on MUN taxpayers. 
In our estimates, we assume that the total population of tax units is correctly measured by our control 
total. The difference between this total and the total recorded in the income tax tabulations is referred 
to as the “missing population”. Moreover, we assume that all individuals not represented in the 
statistics of MUN and CG taxpayers have incomes lower than those who pay tax. This means that the 
Lorenz curve for taxpayers is scaled down and joined with the final point for the missing population. 
In the case shown, the missing population are all assumed to have identical incomes, so the first 
section of the Lorenz curve is a (dashed) straight line. Further assumptions made about the distribution 
within the missing population are discussed below. The points H1 and H2 indicate points on the 
Lorenz curve constructed from the MUN and CG taxpayer data. Figure 4 shows the case where there 
is no tabulated MUN data, only the aggregates. On the assumption that those paying the MUN tax but 
not the CG tax all receive the mean income, the Lorenz curve for this group is represented by the 
dotted line.  
The income attributable to the missing population is one element contributing to the difference 
between the income control total described above and the total income recorded in the tax statistics, 
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where the latter is referred to as the “internal total”. Over the period 1875 to 1951, there was a 
difference of around 20 per cent between the internal and control totals (see Figure A 2), apart from 
during the First World War. In our estimates, total income is taken as equal to the control total. This 
means that we can consider bounds on the Gini coefficient in terms of allocating the difference to 
either under-statement in the tax data or to the missing population. Suppose that the excess of the 
control total over the internal total is equal to a proportion, α, of the internal total, and that a 
proportion β of the internal total is assumed to represent under-statement in the tax data. This leaves 
(α-β) times internal total income to be allocated to the missing population, or (α-β)/(1+α) times overall 
control income. If non-taxpayers constitute a fraction n of the total population, then the amount 
allocated per head to the missing population, expressed relative to the overall mean, is (α-β)/[n(1+α)]. 
This is the overall slope of the first segment of the Lorenz curve.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of taxpayers and missing population 
Percentage of total tax units
Percentage of total income
n
(1-h)
h
(1-n)
H1
H2
Distribution  of 
taxpayers
Missing 
population 
 
 
Implications for the Gini coefficient 
The implications for the Gini coefficient are most easily seen in terms of the area under the Lorenz 
curve, since the Gini is equal to 1 minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve. For taxpayers alone, 
twice the area is equal to 
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B = ΔF1 H1 + ΔF2 {H1+H2} + … + ΔFk {Hk-1+1}     (1) 
 
where ΔFi is the density in the range and Hi denotes the cumulative share of total income up to an 
including range i, where there are k ranges. It follows that the Gini coefficient for taxpayers alone is 
 
 1G B∗ = −          (2) 
 
The introduction of the missing population as in Figure 3 has two effects. It squeezes the Lorenz curve 
for taxpayers to the right. In equation (1), this does not affect Hi but reduces ΔFi, and hence the area B, 
by a factor (1-n). The second effect is that it adds additional area under the first segment. If it is 
assumed that all incomes are non-negative, then the least such addition is zero (i.e. β is set equal to α), 
in the case where the Lorenz curve in Figure 3 initially follows the horizontal axis. Together, these 
two effects give an upper bound UG  for the overall Gini coefficient, which can be calculated to be 
 (1 ) (1 )UG n n G G n G
∗ ∗ ∗= + − = + −       (3) 
It is a weighted average of 1 and G∗ . In 1875, for example, values of n = 16.8 per cent and G∗  = 
47.6 per cent imply that the upper bound is 56.4 per cent.  
 
In the opposite direction, a lower bound might be sought by allocating all the difference to the missing 
population (β is set equal to 0), but this may violate the assumption that the missing population have 
incomes below the lowest income of taxpayers. Moreover, for some years there is contemporary 
evidence on which we can draw. For 1875, the tabulations published by Kiær (1892-3), which we are 
using, included an estimate of the numbers and income of the missing population5. The mean for the 
range NOK Norwegian kroner) 0 to 400 was NOK 230, which was 40.9 per cent of the overall mean. 
If as an illustration, we attribute this amount per unit to the missing tax units, it means that, of the 
uplift moving from the 345.5 million NOK internal total to the 475.8 million NOK control total, 32.6 
million NOK, or 28.3 per cent of the uplift, is allocated to the missing population.  
The lower bound adopted here is calculated by considering the area under the Lorenz curve, where the 
missing population is allocated a fraction h of total income. Twice the area under the Lorenz curve is 
increased therefore by h times n. At the same time the Lorenz curve for taxpayers is squeezed 
vertically by a scale factor (1-h), reducing its area but adding a rectangle, which adds 2h(1-n). The 
resulting lower bound Gini is 
                                                     
5 Incomes below 400 NOK were exempt from taxation. 
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(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )L UG n n G h n G G h n G
∗ ∗ ∗   = + − − + − = − + −        (4)  
 
The last term shows that the difference between the upper and lower bound – a measure of our 
uncertainty about the extent of income inequality in that year – increases, as we would expect, with the 
value of h, magnified by a factor of (1+ (1-n) G∗ ). The 1875 values of h = 8.6 per cent, coupled with 
n = 16.8 and G∗ = 47.6 per cent, generate a difference of 9.6 percentage points from the upper bound, 
or a value for the lower bound of 46.8 per cent.  
Using aggregate data on taxpayers 
For certain years, we have only the aggregate number and total income of the MUN taxpayers who are 
not liable to CG tax, and nothing is known about the distribution among this intermediate group. (We 
do however know the distribution among CG taxpayers.) This is the situation shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Distribution from central government tax, aggregate of municipal taxpayers and missing popu-
lation 
 
 
Let us denote the proportion of the population in the MUN-CG group by m, the proportion of CG 
taxpayers by c, and the proportion of those in neither group is denoted by n (so c+m+n = 1). The 
contributions of the three groups to the overall Gini coefficient may be seen from Figure 4. Denote the 
income share of the bottom group by h, and the combined share of the bottom two groups by g. 
Subtracting twice the area under the Lorenz curve from 1 gives the overall Gini coefficient : 
 
15 
 
{ }1 ( ) 1 (1 )G hn g h m c g g G∗ = − + + + + − −         (5) 
 
where G∗  is the Gini coefficient among the CG taxpayers. This may be re-written by introducing a 
new parameter g' = g-h and replacing g by (g′+h) as 
 
 { } { }1 (1 ) (1 ) 1G c g G g m c g h m cG∗ ∗′ ′ ′= + − − + + − + +     (5a) 
 
The upper bound is obtained by setting h = 0 and holding the other parameters constant. The final term 
in (5a) shows that the difference between G and the upper bound is proportional to h, with a 
magnification factor that is less than 3, but which may nonetheless be substantial. In 1892, the first 
year for which there are only CG data, m = 36.6 per cent, c = 18.8 per cent and G∗  = 44.8 per cent, so 
that the magnification factor is 1.45. 
 
What, if anything, can we say about years for which there are no detailed tabulations of the CG 
taxpayers? The formula (5a) allows us to see the role played by inequality within the group of CG 
taxpayers when h = 0. The term c(1-g′) G∗  is an addition to the overall Gini coefficient. Suppose that 
we do not know G∗ , but do know c and g′ ? So the difference between the bounds would be widened 
to an extent that depends on the product of the population share and the income share of the CG 
taxpayers. While in the nineteenth century, the product may have been small, it was substantially 
higher in the First World War and later. On the other hand, in the years when we have tabulations, the 
Gini coefficient among taxpayers has rarely exceeded 50 per cent or fallen (apart from two exceptions) 
below 30 per cent. In what follows it does not seem unreasonable where G∗  is not known to base the 
upper bound estimate of the Gini coefficient on an assumed 50 per cent and the lower bound on an 
assumed 30 per cent.  
Using data on the assisted poor 
In order to provide more foundation for the treatment of the lower part of the distribution, we need 
additional information on the incomes of those who are below the tax threshold. In search of this, we 
explore one possible source: administrative data on the number of recipients of public assistance and 
the average amounts received. It is assumed that the recipient unit can be equated to the tax unit and 
that recipients have no other source of income apart from the assistance received. To the extent that 
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they have other income, the degree of inequality is over-stated. Operating in the opposite direction is 
the assumption that the total paid in public assistance is divided equally among the assisted population. 
 
In effect, use of this additional administrative information means introducing into the three-group 
model a fourth group: dividing those not paying tax into those who are assisted (the “assisted poor”) 
and who are neither assisted nor taxed (NA/NT). The key assumption underlying our construction of 
the Lorenz curves and calculation of the Gini coefficient is that the groups can be ranked in order of 
increasing income, as shown in Figure 5. This is can only be approximately correct. Liability for 
taxation depends on both income and wealth. People may be liable for MUN taxation on account of 
wealth but have low incomes that would place them below people in the NA/NT group. But it seems a 
reasonable first approximation. 
 
Figure 5: Four groups (including assisted poor) 
 
 
Where the proportion of assisted poor is denote by p, and the proportion in the NA/NT group by n, and 
the share of the first group is denoted by a, then the Gini coefficient is now given by 
{ }1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 1G c g G a n p g c m c h m p cG∗ ∗′ ′= + − − + − + − − + − +    (6) 
 
The population proportions, p, n, m and c are known. Total income received by the assisted poor, and 
by the two groups of taxpayers, is known. Unknown is the total income of the NA/NT group. Here we 
have to make assumptions regarding the upper and lower bound, but with the advantage that this group 
– given our earlier assumption – is “sandwiched” between two groups about which we have 
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information. The upper bound is calculated on the assumption that the NA/NT group has the same 
average income as the assisted poor; the lower bound on the assumption that the average income of the 
NA/NT group is equal to one third of the average income of the MUN-CG group.6 For some years, the 
MUN-CG mean income turns out to be less than three times the mean poverty support. In these cases, 
the imputed income for the NA/NT group will be the same for the upper and lower bound. 
 
Expression (6) for the Gini coefficient does not account for possible dispersion within any of the three 
groups with lowest incomes. However, the POOR and NA/NT groups are always relatively small and 
are "sandwiched" between other groups (or zero, in the case of the poor). This puts a strict upper limit 
on the contribution to the overall Gini that could result from within-group dispersions in these groups. 
For example, the maximum consistent inequality in the poorest group would have the richest 
individuals in this group obtaining the same income as the NA/NT mean income and the poorest 
individuals in this group obtaining zero. The effect of such a distribution would be largest in 1888, 
where the lower bound Gini would increase only from 56.91 to 56.93.7 
 
On the other hand, the MUN-CG group constitutes a relatively large proportion of the population, and 
the data show that the differences between the MUN-CG and CG mean incomes are substantial. For 
this reason, within-group dispersion is introduced for the MUN-CG group. Specifically, the incomes 
within this group are assumed to follow a uniform distribution. The details of this imputation are 
outlined in Appendix F, where the relationship between the dispersion parameter z and the within-
group MUN-CG Gini coeffficient 3G z∗∗ =  is explained. As we maintain the assumption that there is 
no overlap between the income groups, there is a limit to the upper value of z. Overall, a value of 
z=0.4 is consistent with introducing some dispersion without any MUN-CG taxpayers having either 
higher incomes than the lowest in the CG-group or lower incomes than the NA/NT group. Note, 
however, that the overall Gini coefficient proves to be insensitive to changes in z. 
 
                                                     
6 A number of further adjustments have to be made to the published tabulations in making these 4-group calculations. 
Assumptions are necessary when calculating the upper and lower bounds. For G∗ , if the within-group Gini of the CG 
taxpayers is not available, the upper bound uses the maximum of the previous and next observation of G∗ . Similarly, the 
lower bound uses the minimum of the previous and next observation if there are no data. For the years 1875 to 1891, when 
there was no CG taxation, and the MUN-CG group is not defined, the average income of the NA/NT group in the calculation 
of the upper bound Gini is taken as NOK 150. NOK 150 was 25 per cent of the mean income of workers and 33 per cent of 
the mean income of farmers (including cotters) in 1888/89 (Sth. Prp. Nr 48, 1890).).  
7 Graphically, we obtain the upper bound from 5 by extending the line for the NA/NT group (the slope of this group is the 
mean income of NA/NT relative to the population mean) down to zero. The resulting triangle (the contribution to the overall 
Gini from the poor group) is 𝑎𝑎
2
∙ �𝑝𝑝 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
ℎ−𝑎𝑎
�. Introducing dispersion to the NA/NT group would decrease the maximum 
consistent contribution from the poor group. 
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Finally, in 1875 and 1888 (the years before the introduction of the CG tax in 1892) there was no state 
taxation, but instead detailed tabulations of the incomes of MUN taxpayers. We then assume that the 
lowest tabulated income group in the MUN tabulations is equivalent to the MUN-CG groups in later 
years, and that the higher-income groups would have been subject to CG tax had that been in effect 
these years. 
 
To sum up, this gives the Gini coefficient for the years 1875, 1888 and 1892-1951 as 
 
G = 1 - pa - n(a+h) - m(2h+g') - c(1+g'+h) +c(1-g'-h) G∗ ) + g'mG∗∗    (7) 
 
where  
a = total income of poor relative to control total,  
h = total income of poor and non-assisted/non-taxed (NA/NT) relative to control total,  
g = total income of poor, NA/NT and MUN-CG (adjusted) relative to control total,  
g' = g-h = total income of MUN taxpayers who are not CG taxpayers,  
p = poor as proportion of total tax units,  
n = NA/NT as proportion of total tax units,  
m = MUN-CG taxpayers (those who pay municipal tax but not central government tax) as proportion 
of total tax units,  
c = CG taxpayers as proportion of total tax units,  
G∗∗ = Gini coefficient among MUN-CG taxpayers, 
G∗ = Gini coefficient among CG taxpayers.  
 
Expression (7) takes as starting point extreme inequality where the Lorenz curve follows the 
horizontal axis between 0 and 1. The first four terms then subtract the areas of the triangles and 
parallelograms below the Lorenz curve as illustrated in Figure 5. The latter two terms add in the 
within-group Gini coefficients for the two richest groups, scaled by group sizes and income shares. 8 
                                                     
8 While the Gini coefficient is calculated directly from (7), we can also construct Lorenz curves using the assumptions outlined 
here. These are available as an online appendix. In these Lorenz curves, a Pareto distribution is used for inequality within the 
richest (CG) group, with the dispersion and lower bound parameters set to match the mean income and Gini coefficients of this 
group, respectively. As long as these two restrictions are satisfied, the choice of within-group dispersion has no impact on the 
estimated Gini coefficient for the entire population or any partition of the population that includes the entire CG group. 
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Bounds for 1952 to present 
The above discussion has described the bounds applied for the period 1875 to 1951. For the period 
after 1951, when coverage was greater, relatively high numbers of tabulated intervals have been 
published by Statistics Norway (Historical Statistics 1978). From 1967 onwards the incomes of the 
entire population of taxpayers are available as micro data. For this reason, the set of necessary 
assumptions for this period is smaller, corresponding to the situation shown in Figure 3, where the 
assumptions relate only to the mean income of the missing population. These assumptions are 
designed to be comparable with those for the earlier period, while taking account of the changing role 
of assistance to the poor in the 1960s and later. In particular, there is a break in the series of poverty 
support between 1964 and 1967, making mean payout per supported individual a less appropriate 
value for imputation at the lower end of the income distribution. 
 
The upper bound of the Gini coefficient is based on assuming (i) that those not covered by the tax 
tabulations have a mean income equal to the mean assistance (as before) for the years up to 1964 and 
(ii) that from 1967 it is based on the group receiving 50 per cent of the minimum pension for a single 
person.9 The lower bound is based on those not covered by the tax tabulations receiving mean income 
equal to 150 per cent of the mean income assumed for the upper bound. 
 
We should emphasize at this point that the final series is based on a consistent population throughout 
the period. Despite the change from household-based to individual-based taxation, we can replicate the 
core households from before 1960 on the post-1966 microdata by merging spouses using personal ID 
numbers in the latter that link taxpayers and the population recorded on an individual basis. The first 
year in which married women could choose to file taxes individually is 1960. For the years 1960-1966, 
we therefore transform the data to household basis using data from the 1960 Census as well as the 
joint distribution of income, marriage and tax status in 1967. Similarly, adjustments are applied to 
account for a separate taxation system for sailors (1948-1966) and company taxation (1921-1947). 
These adjustments are all described in detail in Appendix E.  
                                                     
9 For the years 1965 and 1966, the minimum pension was projected back from 1967 (when it was introduced) in line with the 
growth of seamen's pensions, which were introduced in 1950. The same process applied to 1964 yielded a figure of NOK 
2,140, which was close to the poverty support level in that year of NOK 1,975. 
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4 The long-run series: Income inequality in Norway 1875 to the 
present 
The results of these calculations are brought together in Figure 6, which shows the upper and lower 
bounds for the Gini coefficient. , The difference between the upper and lower bounds is largest for the 
period before 1914. The average difference over the period from 1892 to 1914 is 9.8 percentage points, 
whereas the average difference from 1915 to 1951 is 2.2 percentage points. The latter seems quite 
modest. While the difference represents potential error introduced at the stage of data analysis, and is not 
comparable with the sampling error typically considered in distributional analysis, it is nonetheless 
interesting to compare their magnitudes. On that basis, the 1892 to 1914 figure appears quite large, but 
the 1915 to 1951 average difference is not dissimilar from the confidence intervals obtained from the 
reported standard errors for the Gini coefficients obtained from household surveys: for example, the 95 
per cent confidence interval for the Gini coefficient of the distribution of disposable equivalent 
(household) income in Norway varied between 1.4 and 3.6 for the period 1986 to 1993.  
 
Figure 6: Gini coefficient for Norway, 1875-present. Upper and lower bound 
 
Sources: See text. 
 
The series prior to 1915 must therefore be regarded with more caution than that for the past 100 years. 
This applies particularly in the earlier Figure 1, where we take the mean of the upper and lower 
bounds to give an “average series”. The averaging is done, since we recognize that a single series is 
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what many researchers require and that, if we do not ourselves provide an average, users will do so. At 
the same time, there is no evident justification for taking a simple average. A case can be made that 
the upper bound attributes an unreasonably low income to those recording zero. The appropriate 
weights may vary over the time period. But the simple average provides a point of reference.  
One immediate question is: what additionally do we learn from the new series in Figure 6 compared to 
the top income series previously published by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010)? In a number of periods, 
overall inequality and top income shares move closely together. Between 1939 and 1953, for instance, 
the Gini coefficient fell from 59 per cent to 41-43 per cent, and the share of the top 1 per cent fell from 
13 per cent to 7 per cent. However, the experience of the next three decades was rather different. There 
was a significant decline in the share of the top 1 per cent, from 7.1 per cent in 1953 to 4.1 per cent in 
1989, whereas over the period as a whole the Gini coefficient was little altered: in 1989 it was 39-41 
per cent. Since 1989, the share of the top 1 per cent has regained the lost ground, being 7.8 per cent in 
2011, and the Gini coefficient too has risen – although only to around 45 per cent. This difference 
between the time paths of the top shares and the Gini shows that, while the top share may have driven 
much of the recent increase in overall inequality, there were other forces in operation that mean that 
not all of the post-war equalization has been lost.  
 
If we ask whether Norway is back where it was a hundred years ago, just before the First World War, 
then the evidence for top shares is limited to two observations (1910 and 1913). In our Gini series, we 
have constructed annual observations. These show that the Gini coefficient, averaged over 2000-2011, 
was 46 per cent, compared with 57 per cent in 1900-1914 averaged. Overall inequality has not 
returned to the levels of 100 years ago. 
 
Second, there have been distinct periods of rise and fall in overall income inequality. There was a fall 
of some 6 points in the averaged Gini coefficient between the late 1880s/early 1890 and1914, followed 
by a volatile period that included both significant increase and decrease between 1914 and 1923 (with 
a net change of 2 points), a rise of 4 percentage points from 1923 to 1939, a large fall, as noted above, 
from 1939 to 1953 of 17 points, a fall of 2 percentage points from 1953 to 1989 and a rise of some 5 
points since 1989. Taken together, -6, -2, +4, -17, -2 and +5 yields an overall change of -18 percentage 
points. Thirdly, it is evident from Figures 1 and 8 that the changes in overall income inequality have 
been quantitatively larger – in both directions – in the second part of the period. Leaving aside the 
World Wars (and 1892), the Gini coefficient in the four decades from the 1890s to the end of the 
1930s was in the range of 60 per cent plus or minus 5 percentage points. The Second World War and 
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early postwar decline was much larger, and the post-1989 reversal took the Gini from around 40 per 
cent to around 45 per cent in two decades. 
 
The long-run history of income inequality in Norway is indeed a rich story that needs to be considered 
in terms of episodes of change. We turn now to consider the individual sub-periods in more detail.  
Before 1914 
The wide bounds for this period limit what we can say, but this is a period of considerable intrinsic 
interest, and one for which few countries have data about the distribution of income on a regular basis 
covering the period of industrialization. For example, over the 20 years from 1894 to 1914, the upper 
bound fell by some 4 percentage points and the lower bound fell by 3 percentage points. There was a 
moderate convergence of the two bounds that tells us that inequality cannot have changed dramatically 
during this period. There is some evidence of increasing inequality between 1875 and 1888, but from 
1888 onwards there is little sign of a rise in overall income inequality as would be associated with the 
Kuznets curve.  
 
The nineteenth century data may tell more about change at a less grand scale. For example, Norway 
was hit by a depression from around 1876 onwards (Grytten 2008b). Growth rates were low, and 
emigration to North America increased sharply from 1880. This was followed by high economic 
growth in the 1890s, which ended in the so-called "Kristiania crash" in 1899 leading to substantial 
drops in property values and stagnation for several years. In particular, there appears to have been a 
downward tendency in overall inequality over the years from the mid-1890s to around 1905, followed 
by remarkable stability from 1905 to 1914.  
The World Wars  
The Gini coefficients in Figure 6 show a sharp rise during the First World War, peaking in 1917. 
Norway was neutral, but its merchant fleet played a significant role (Grytten, 2008b). However, there 
was a severe recession that replaced a boom during the end of the war. Historical statistics provided by 
Statistics Norway show a drop in GDP per capita (at fixed prices) of 10 per cent from 1916 to1917 and 
5 per cent from 1917 to 1918. There was also high inflation during this period. As demonstrated by 
Figure 6 the Gini coefficient was heavily affected by the boom in 1916 and the subsequent recession 
in 1917.  
In contrast, the Second World War saw a marked fall in overall inequality and in the share of the top 1 
per cent. The Gini coefficient was some 6 percentage points lower in 1945 than in 1939. The 
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circumstances were very different, with Norway, like Denmark, being invaded by Germany in 1940 
and occupied until 1945. In this case, there is evidence on top shares for a range of countries, and this 
shows that declining top income shares during the Second World War was a quite widely-experienced 
phenomenon. Of the seventeen countries for which there is evidence on the share of the top 1 per cent, 
in all but two (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) the top share fell between 1939 and 1945 
(Atkinson, 2015, page 57). At the same time, reductions in top shares were not limited to the war 
years. In the case of the Norwegian Gini coefficient, the decline from 1939 to 1945 accounted for only 
6 points out of the total decline of 17 points from 1939 to 1953.  
 
The periods of World War were, we hope sui generis, but the Norwegian experience, with evidence 
from both, may serve to dispel the impression that it was during wartime that large reductions in 
inequality were secured. Overall inequality actually both rose and declined during the First World 
War. The fall in the Second World War only accounted for a fraction of the reduction that took place 
during the twentieth century. 
Inequality in peacetime 
What do we find if we turn to peacetime periods? For the inter-war period, from Figure 6, it may be 
seen that there was an initial fall and then a fairly steady rise in the Gini from 1923 onwards. The 
interwar period saw substantial economic hardship, including a banking crisis during the early 1920s 
where the five largest banks went into bankruptcy.  
 
Both upper and lower bounds show a rise in the Gini coefficient of 4 percentage points between 1923 
and 1939. No special significance attaches to 1929 (the US stock market collapse). We return below to 
the rather different experience of Norway, and other Nordic countries, during the Great Depression. 
 
After the Second World War, inequality fell. Between 1946 and 1966, the bounds fell by between 6 
and 7 percentage points. The fall continued according to the register data: between 1967 and 1980, the 
bounds fell by between 4 and 5 percentage points. This fall in inequality was reversed at the end of the 
1980s. Over the period from 1989 to 2013, both the upper and lower bound of the Gini coefficient 
increased by some 5 percentage points. It has to be remembered that the graph shows bounds, not 
where we are located between these bounds. However, even if, in an unlikely event, the true value had 
been at the upper bound in 1989 and the lower bound in 2013, there would have been an increase of 3 
percentage points. On the other hand, most of the increase in the Gini coefficient took place between 
1989 and 1995: 71 per cent of the increase in the upper bound and 83 per cent of the increase in the 
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lower bound. It was more of a step up than a continuing upward trend. For this reason, it is better to 
talk about “increased inequality” than about “rising inequality”. 
Upper tail Gini, mean income gap and affluence 
Before the Second World War, the detailed tabulated data by range cover only the highest-income part 
of the population, which means that we have a better informational basis for describing the upper than 
the lower tail of the income distribution. In view of this, we now provide estimates of the mean and 
Gini coefficient for the 50 per cent richest proportion of the population and use this information as a 
basis for estimating a measure of “affluence” introduced by Aaberge and Atkinson (2016). The 
affluence measure is defined by  
 
 
1
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µ µ µ
µ µ
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= + 
  ,     (8a)  
 
where µ  is the overall mean income and Uµ  and UG  are, respectively, the mean and the Gini 
coefficient of the conditional distribution of income given that the income is larger than the median. 
Inserting the well-known expressions for Uµ  and UG  in (8a) yields the following alternative 
expression for A, 
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where 1( )F t−  is the income of the individual with rank t  in the distribution of income F . Expression 
(8b) shows that A can be interpreted as a weighted average of top income shares, where the weight 
increases from 0 to 4/3 with increasing rank. The affluence measure, A, has itself range [ ]0,1  and 
takes the value 0 if and only if all individuals receive the same income µ . At the other extreme, when 
total income is received by one individual, then A takes the value 1. Note that 3A becomes equal to the 
richness gap (the second term within the parenthesis of (8a)) if individuals with higher income than the 
median income receive the same income Uµ .  
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Figure 7: Gini for entire population, Gini above median and affluence measure. Mean of upper and lower 
bound calculations 
 
Sources: See text. 
 
The estimation results for the affluence measure A and the upper tail (above median) Gini coefficient 
UG  are displayed in Figure 7. It is reassuring that the affluence measure and the upper tail Gini 
reproduce the time pattern of the overall Gini; not least since the available data provide more reliable 
estimates for the affluence measure and the upper tail Gini before the Second World War. However, 
note that the reliability of the affluence and the upper tail Gini partly carries over to the estimated 
overall Gini series. This is due to the fact that income distributions normally are skewed to the right, 
which means that the upper tail Gini contributes to a significantly larger proportion of the overall Gini 
than the lower tail Gini. Aaberge and Atkinson (2016) demonstrated that the overall Gini is equal to 
3( ) 4A P+ , where P is the poverty counterpart of the affluence measure A. So that, in 1900, with G = 
0.586 and A = 0.515 (see Table A5), the contribution from the affluence term to the overall G was 66 
per cent, while the affluence contribution had declined only marginally to 62 per cent one hundred 
years later.  
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Figure 7 shows the difference between the overall Gini and that for the upper half of the distribution. 
Although the pattern of the overall Gini broadly speaking is reflected by the upper tail Gini, the 
difference in magnitude has varied significantly over time. The largest difference is found after the 
Second World War, from late 1940s to late 1980s/early 1990s, when the gap was some 20 percentage 
points, approaching half of the total Gini. This was a period characterized by strict regulations and 
high marginal tax rates. The turning point came in the 1980s, when the difference between the overall 
Gini and the upper Gini fell to around 15 percentage points. This was accentuated by the banking 
crises and recession, the implementation of a major tax reform, a sharp increase in the dividends and 
capital gains among the richest people and a subsequent increase in the top income shares. By contrast, 
the rise in overall inequality during the 2000s was mainly driven by the sharp rise in upper tail 
inequality during this period, when the gap did not change. 10  
 
Another way of presenting the results is in terms of the affluence measure, shown in Figure 7. Since 
the sum of the upper (above median) mean and the lower (below median) mean is equal to twice the 
overall mean it follows from expression (8) that the affluence measure A is fully determined by the 
inequality in the distribution of income above the median income and by the relative gap between the 
upper and lower means. So that an affluence score of 0.296 in 1980 is generated by a Gini for the 
upper group equal to 20.3 per cent and a relative income level of 1.57. By 1995, the Gini for the upper 
group had risen to 29.3 per cent, but he relative upper mean had risen only to 1.6 (see Figure A 1), so 
that the rise in the affluence score to 0.357 was less dramatic than the change in the Gini. Thus, the 
increase in income inequality among the richest 50 per cent proportion of the population had a 
stronger effect on the change in overall inequality than the reduction in the (small) rise in the 
difference in average income between the 50 per cent richest and 50 per cent poorest proportions.  
A series of episodes and their causes 
The evolution of inequality in Norway is, we believe,best characterized as a series of episodes 
identified with sub-periods, which are summarized in Table 1. As demonstrated by the change in 
percentage points, the evolution of the overall Gini coefficient is closely related to the evolution of the 
upper group Gini and the Gini-based affluence measure. In the same way, the relative income of the 
upper group moves typically in the same direction.  
 
The contribution in terms of magnitudes does however differ. Taken together, the periods from 1875 
to 1939 show unchanged affluence, whereas the upper tail inequality decreased by 5 percentage points. 
                                                     
10 See Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) for a further discussion of the development of top income shares in Norway. 
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The different evolution of upper tail and overall inequality (and affluence) corresponds to a significant 
rise in the ratio between mean incomes of the upper and lower half of the population (see Figure A 1). 
Since the average relative income gap between the upper and lower half stayed fairly flat during the 
last 60 years the rise in overall inequality and affluence after 1980 was largely due to rising upper tail 
inequality, the rich became richer as is also confirmed by the rising top income shares in this period. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the evolution of overall inequality, upper tail inequality and affluence 
(Changes in percentage points in parentheses) 
Period Overall Gini 
coefficient 
Gini-based measure 
of affluence 
Upper tail Gini 
coefficient 
Mean income of 
upper tail relative to 
overall mean 
1875 – 1892 Increase (+7) Increase (+8) Slight increase (+1) Increase 
1892 - 1914 Decrease (-8) Decrease (-10) Decrease (-8) Decrease 
1914 – 1917 Increase (+9) Increase (+7) Increase (+4) Increase 
1917 - 1923 Decrease (-11) Decrease (-10) Decrease (-6) Decrease 
1923 - 1939 Increase (+5) Increase (+5) Increase (+4) Increase 
1939 – 1953 Decrease (-17) Decrease (-20) Decrease (-14) Decrease 
1953 – 1980 Slight decrease (-2) Slight decrease (-2) Slight decrease (-2) Slight decrease 
1980 - 2013 Increase (+5) Increase (+5) Increase (+12) Slight increase 
 
To get some intution about the magnitude of these changes, note that the 15 percentage points fall in 
overall inequality from 1875 to 1953 corresponds to a decrease in the Gini coefficient of 25 per cent. 
This is equal to the redistributive effect of the following hypothetical tax/transfer intervention (see 
Aaberge, 1997) in 1875: introduce a flat tax with tax rate equal to 25 per cent and allocate the 
collected tax as fixed lump-sum equal to the average tax 140 NOK. Then the 50 per cent poorest on 
average increase their income from 202 to 290 NOK, whereas the 50 per cent richest get their mean 
income reduced from 920 to 830 NOK. Similarly, this hypothetical intervention would change the 
income of the poor from 85 to 204 NOK and those at the 95th percentile from 1463 to 1237 NOK. 
 
Turning to the macro-economic influences, what can we say about the extent to which the pattern of 
evolution of overall inequality is consistent with the evolution of the Norwegian economy? For the 
United States, as shown in Section 6, overall inequality rose during the “roaring 1920s”, followed by a 
collapse after 1929. On the other hand, it has been argued that the Nordic experience of the Great 
Depression was different: “the crisis was milder and shorter than in most other Western economies at 
the time, i.e. GDP growth rate and prices fell less and recovery was faster. However, despite the 
relatively rapid recovery in production, unemployment remained persistently high throughout the 
decade [the 1930s]” (Grytten, 2008a, page 370). The link between the macro-economy and income 
distribution has been a recurring theme. Aukrust (1957) sought to understand the difference between 
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the inter-war period and the immediate post-war period in terms of the relation with factor shares, 
where there had been an upward shift in the wage share (1957, Chart A). Aaberge et al (2000) 
investigated the impact of unemployment shocks on income distribution in the Nordic countries during 
the economic crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They concluded that the relation with 
unemployment is complex and may operate in the long-term rather than immediately. In a comparative 
study of OECD countries over the period 1970-1996, Checchi and Peñalosa (2010) examine the 
variation of the Gini coefficient, first with the labour share, and then with the simultaneous 
determinants of the share, the decile ratio for earnings and the unemployment rate. 
 
The framework proposed by Checchi and Peñalosa provides a convenient organizing device, not least 
because it is based on an underlying theoretical model that it gives a role to labour market institutions 
that are relevant to the statistically significant coefficients (at 1 per cent level) in (Checchi and 
Peñalosa, 2010, Table 5). The omission of one variable in particular should be noted, in view of its 
prominence in the public debate: the unemployment benefit rate. Checchi and Peñalosa “find no 
evidence of a robust effect of the unemployment benefit on inequality” (2010, page 433). But there is 
a major obstacle to applying such a framework to the long-run series on inequality presented here: that 
we lack data for earlier years on key variables, such as unemployment.  
 
Table 2: Changes in demographic and macroeconomic indicators in Norway 1875 to present 
Period Demographic changes. 
Proportion 20 years and 
over. Per cent 
Employment by industry. 
Per cent 
GDP by industries. 
Per cent 
Average annual 
GDP per capita 
growth. 
Per cent 
Prim. 
Ind. 
Second. 
Ind. 
Service 
sector 
Prim. 
Ind. 
Second. 
Ind. 
Service 
sector 
1875-
1892 
55  
Overseas emigration in 
this period was 261 000. 
50 21 29 33 
 
25  42 0.7 
1892 – 
1914 
55  
Overseas emigration in 
this period was 312 000. 
45 24 31 26 28 46 1.6 
1914 – 
1923 
57 
Total emigration 
60 000. 
43 24 33 23 29 48 1.1 
(large year-to-
year changes) 
1923 – 
1939 
62  
Total emigration 
81 000. 
41 25 34 17 33 50 3.1 
1939 – 
1953 
69  
Sharp decrease in 
overseas emigration. 
32 29 39 15 35 50 2.3 
1953-
1980 
68  17 35 48 10 35 55 3.6 
1980 – 
2013 
73  5 27 68 5 40 55 1.8 
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Sources: Calculated from official population statistics (Column 1); Hansen and Skoglund (2008, 2009) 
(Columns 3-7); historical GDP statistics (Column 8). 
 
Table 2 highlights changes in some basic demographic and economic conditions in Norway between 
1875 and 2013 for which data are avilable. By comparing Tables 1 and 2 we find no clear relationship 
between the evolution of income inequality and changes in either the proportion of adults in the 
population, the emigration rate or the economic growth. For example, emigration was high both 
between 1875 and 1892 and between 1892 and1914, while inequality rose in the first period and 
declined in the last period. High economic growth was associated with decreasing inequality in the 
1892-1914 period, but with increasing inequality in the 1923-1939 period. Between 1953 and 1980, 
when GDP per capita grew by an average of 3.6 per cent annually, the Gini coefficient stayed fairly 
stable.  
 
Although we do not find a general relationship between economic growth and changes in inequality, 
we find strong association in volatility between these two indicators during the turbulent years of the 
First World War and the early 1920s. In this period, there were large fluctuations both in year-to-year 
GDP growth and in income inequality.  
 
The concentration in time of the sharp decrease in the Gini coefficient between 1939 and 1953 is 
likely a combination of several factors. First, the manner of operation of labor market institutions 
changed significantly during the 1930s, where collective bargaining was introduced at the national 
level. Economic turbulence may have postponed the immediate effects of these reforms. Second, more 
than 40 per cent of the work force was still in agriculture the 1930s, and rural-urban migration (and 
hence income equalization) was again held back by high unemployment. The Second World War is 
likely to have had an equalizing effect in itself, with more controls imposed on the economy and the 
German occupation leading to increased labor demand for construction projects. 
 
The evolution of inequality may also reflect quite specific events. The Gini coefficients for the overall 
distribution and for the upper half fell by 3 and 3.5 percentage points from 1945 to 1946 largely due to 
a nonrecurring tax on wealth increases that took place during the German occupation of Norway. The 
tax had highly progressive rates. The first 5000 NOK in wealth increase during the period 1940-1945 
were tax-free, while the next 10,000 NOK were taxed at 30 percent. Above this level the tax rate rose 
stepwise up to 95 percent which was assessed for wealth increases beyond 70 000 NOK (the mean 
pre-tax income in 1945 was 3800 NOK). As a result the gap in the average income between the upper 
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half and the lower half of the income distribution and the inequality in the upper half incomes declined 
significantly during this period.  
6 Different income definitions 
This paper describes the evolution of inequality in Norway using the same population and definitions 
of household and income for the entire period 1875-2013. As indicated in the introduction our choice 
of definitions is dictated by constraints in available data sources. This is why we have adopted a gross 
income definition, whereas statistical agencies today provide inequality estimates on the basis of 
disposable equivalent income.  
 
Figure 8: Gini coefficient for Norway, two definitions 
 
Sources: See text. 
 
The closest Norway gets to an official definition of income inequality is Statistics Norway's time 
series from 1986 onwards.11 The construction of this series diverges from the approach used elsewhere 
in this paper in three ways. First, the household definition includes everyone living together with joint 
consumption except students not living at home. To account for scale economics the standard EU 
                                                     
11 See http://www.ssb.no/inntekt-og-forbruk/statistikker/ifhus 
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equivalence scale is used. Second, a somewhat larger set of income sources (various types of non-
taxable transfers) is included compared to the "gross income" concept used in this paper. Third, the 
income basis is post-tax rather than pre-tax. 
 
In Figure 8, we compare the evolution of the Gini coefficient since 1986 for two alternative definitions 
of income. As expected the level of the "official" series is much lower than the long-term series. This 
is largely due to the redistributive effects of public transfers and a progressive tax system, but it also 
reflects the treatment of the income unit. The use of a wider definition tends to reduce recorded 
inequality, since it assumes a greater degree of income-sharing. Accounting for scale economics in 
larger households has also a significant effect on the measured level of inequality. However, since our 
focus is on the evolution of inequality we find it reassuring that the pattern of the historic series 
captures the pattern of the official series from 1986 onwards. Most important here is that the 
development of inequality over time is similar for the two definitions. There was a significant increase 
from 1986 to around 2000, turbulence around the tax reforms of the early 2000s and a slight increase 
thereafter.  
7 Comparison with Denmark and the United States 
It is interesting to compare the estimates for Norway with the Gini coefficients for the same period for 
Denmark, one of the few countries for which such a series can be constructed back to the 1870s using 
income tax records12, and with the shorter Gini series for the United States that, by linking, can be 
taken back to 1918. In Figure 9, the series for Norway are compared with the Gini coefficient based on 
the research of Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) for Denmark. The “continuous” Gini series for Denmark 
takes the average of the upper and lower bounds of the series given in that paper, (b) adjusts the 
estimates for 1970 to 1980 to a pre-1970 basis, by attributing all of the change between 1968 and 1970 
to the switch to an individual basis, subtracting 7.9 percentage points, (c) linking to the micro-data 
series from 1980 onwards, and (d) putting the figures from 1994 onwards on to a pre-1994 basis by 
adding 4.26 percentage points (the difference between 1994 and 1993).13 It is a Gini coefficient for 
family incomes and relates to gross income including transfers but before deduction of tax.  
                                                     
12 Denmark had only one year with tabulated data for the 19th century (in 1870), but 26 observations for the first part of the 
20th century. By contrast, Norway had 10 years with tabulated data for the 19th century and 7 observations with tabulated data 
between 1900 and 1938. Moreover, for Norway aggregate data on tax payers and assisted poor have been used for the entire 
period 1892 – 1951.  
13 This set of assumptions has been made by Atkinson; Jakob Søgaard should not be held in any way responsible.  
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Figure 9: Gini coefficients for Norway and Denmark compared 
 
Sources: Figure 8 and calculations from Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) 
 
The similarity in the movements in the series in Norway and Denmark up to the mid-1970s is 
remarkable. Over the period 1903 to the mid-1920s they move virtually in tandem. There was the rise 
in the early part of the twentieth century, followed by a steep increase in the First World War. The 
increase during the war is striking. While the rise in one country might be explained away as a 
statistical anomaly, the fact that it is found independently in both countries shows that something 
dramatic indeed happened during the First World War.  
 
The fall in overall income inequality from before the Second World War to 1970 was large in both 
Denmark and Norway, but later there was a significant departure, as inequality continued to fall in 
Denmark until the mid-1980s. Both countries have seen a rise in recent years, but the differing 
experience during the 1970s leaves Denmark with a lower overall level at the end of the period. (It 
should be re-emphasized that these figures relate to gross incomes.)  
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Comparison with the United States 
The comparison with the United States (US) is less easily made. Not only is the time period shorter by 
some 40 years, but the length of coverage in the US is only achieved by linking together different 
studies with different definitions. The Gini in Figure 10 for the US is that given by Atkinson and 
Morelli (2016). It is based initially on the Gini for the gross income of income recipients based on the 
NBER/Brookings synthetic estimates, calculated from the tabulations in Mitchell et al (1921, Table 
25) and Leven, Moulton and Warburton (1934, Tables 27 and 29, excluding capital gains), linked to 
the BEA synthetic series for gross family incomes from Brandolini (2002, Table A1), who calculated 
the Gini coefficients from the original tabulations, which in turn is linked to the series from 1944 
given by Budd (1970, Table 6), and linked at 1967 to the Gini coefficient for gross equivalised 
household income from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2012, (Table A-3, Selected measures of equivalence-adjusted income 
dispersion), where we have assumed that half of the recorded change between 1992 and 1993 was due 
to the change in methods (and therefore added 1.15 percentage points to the values from 1992 back to 
1967. 
 
The second issue concerns the definitions of income and income unit. The most recent US data relate 
to household income and are equivalised. As noted in the previous section, use of household income 
reduces measured inequality. On the other hand, the US data relate to gross income. The US income 
definition applicable in the most recent period is described as follows: “money income received 
(exclusive of certain money receipts such as capital gains) before payments for personal income taxes, 
social security, union dues, Medicare deductions, etc. Therefore, money income does not reflect the 
fact that some families receive noncash benefits, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance/food 
stamps, health benefits, subsidized housing, and goods produced and consumed on the farm (US 
Bureau of the Census, 2015, page 21).  
 
The two series in Figure 10 should be viewed with these qualifications in mind. It does not follow that 
overall income inequality in 1918 was less in the US than in Norway. The relative changes over time 
may also not be fully comparable. Nevertheless, they suggest that there are interesting commonalities 
and interesting differences. In both countries there was a decline in income inequality in the Second 
World War, as there was in Denmark. The rise in inequality from 1980 to the present is not much 
smaller in Norway than in the US, which may come as a surprise to some readers. The Gini coefficient 
in Norway increased by 5.8 percentage points between 1980 and 2013; that for the US increased by 
8.0 percentage points. But there are also contrasts. After the Great Crash, overall inequality appears to 
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have fallen in the US, but there was, if anything, a rise in Norway. The difference may reflect the US 
policies pursued in the New Deal, but this requires closer investigation. More recently, inequality 
appears to have been rising over the 1970s in the US, but falling in Norway.  
Figure 10: Gini coefficients in Norway and US compared 
 
Sources: See text 
8 Summary of findings 
This paper may be seen as an exercise in constructing bricks with a minimum of straw. But, while 
stressing the limitations of our materials and methods, we should begin this summary by saying that 
there is some straw. For every year in our series, there is some underlying information on individual 
incomes, even if of a highly aggregated form. We have not interpolated observations between years or 
extrapolated from comparisons with other countries. The position is perhaps best described in terms of 
a continuum with national income totals at one end and individual micro-data at the other end. For part 
of the earlier period we are close to, but not at, the national income end, using a small number of 
aggregated variables (such as the numbers of taxpayers). Over time, we move closer to the individual 
data that we ideally use. 
 
35 
 
Our findings – with attached qualifications - suggest that at the end of the nineteenth century, the Gini 
coefficient for gross family income in Norway was between 50-60 per cent. Such an apparently Latin 
American value casts some doubt on the claim made in the official publication for the Paris Exhibition 
of 1900 that “among civilised states, there is scarcely any that is so fortunate with regard to the 
equality of its social conditions as Norway. There is no nobility with political or economic privilege, 
no large estates, no capitalist class” (Norway, 1900, page 203).  
 
Today overall inequality of gross family incomes in Norway is lower than it was a hundred years ago. 
When did it change? It appears that overall gross income inequality among families in Norway 
• Fell from 1892 to 1914, largely due to fall in inequality among the upper half of the 
income distribution; 
• Reached an upward spike during the First World War (as in Denmark), but fell during 
the Second World War due to a decrease in upper income inequality as well as decline 
in the gap of the mean income between the upper and lower half of the population;  
• Rose between 1923 and 1939, largely due to increase in inequality among the upper 
half of the population; 
• Fell substantially between 1948 and 1953 as a result of decline in both upper tail ine-
quality and the gap between upper and lower tail means; 
• Stayed broadly flat between 1953 and 1980; 
• Has risen again since 1980; largely due to increased upper tail inequality. 
 
Expressed this way, the history of Norwegian income inequality is better seen as a series of episodes 
than as the working-out of some long-run pattern. It cannot be summarized as an inverse U or a U. In 
this respect, our conclusions for Norway run on similar lines to those of Lindert and Williamson for 
the United States over the period since 1700, where they say that “inequality movements are driven 
not by any fundamental law of capitalist development but instead by episodic shifts in six basic forces: 
politics, demography, education policy, trade competition, finance, and labor- saving technological 
change” (2016, page 12). 
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Appendix A: Gini and other key variables for Norway 1875-2013 
Below are shown three tables: 
• Overall Gini coefficient and other measures of income dispersion 
• Income and population totals for the four groups 
• Parameters used for the calculation of the "four-group" Gini coefficient 
The information is also available as an Online Appendix in Excel and format (on request). 
Moreover, plots of Lorenz curves for all years are available as a PDF file. 
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Table A 1: Gini coefficient and affluence measures, 1875-2013 , Upper and lower bound 
measures 
 
Upper bound assumptions Lower bound assumptions 
Year 
Gini 
coefficient 
𝜇𝜇𝑈𝑈
𝜇𝜇
 Gini (above median) Affluence  
Gini 
coefficient 
𝜇𝜇𝑈𝑈
𝜇𝜇
 Gini (above median) Affluence  
1875 0.556 1.651 0.508 0.496 0.540 1.651 0.508 0.496 
1888 0.641 1.828 0.489 0.574 0.569 1.763 0.489 0.542 
1892 0.643 1.807 0.515 0.580 0.637 1.796 0.515 0.574 
1893 0.631 1.801 0.491 0.562 0.607 1.761 0.491 0.542 
1894 0.610 1.785 0.461 0.536 0.576 1.729 0.461 0.509 
1895 0.602 1.770 0.462 0.530 0.573 1.724 0.462 0.507 
1896 0.600 1.770 0.454 0.525 0.568 1.718 0.454 0.500 
1897 0.601 1.765 0.460 0.525 0.570 1.716 0.460 0.501 
1898 0.602 1.760 0.467 0.527 0.574 1.716 0.467 0.506 
1899 0.606 1.764 0.469 0.530 0.577 1.720 0.469 0.508 
1900 0.597 1.751 0.469 0.524 0.575 1.716 0.469 0.507 
1901 0.585 1.736 0.459 0.511 0.564 1.703 0.459 0.495 
1902 0.579 1.728 0.454 0.504 0.558 1.696 0.454 0.489 
1903 0.578 1.729 0.451 0.503 0.557 1.696 0.451 0.487 
1904 0.569 1.717 0.445 0.494 0.549 1.686 0.444 0.478 
1905 0.565 1.707 0.450 0.492 0.550 1.686 0.449 0.481 
1906 0.573 1.717 0.453 0.498 0.559 1.694 0.453 0.487 
1907 0.579 1.721 0.458 0.504 0.559 1.699 0.446 0.486 
1908 0.574 1.710 0.461 0.500 0.556 1.693 0.447 0.483 
1909 0.578 1.714 0.466 0.504 0.559 1.695 0.451 0.486 
1910 0.580 1.716 0.469 0.507 0.564 1.703 0.452 0.491 
1911 0.580 1.713 0.470 0.506 0.563 1.698 0.452 0.489 
1912 0.572 1.698 0.471 0.499 0.549 1.686 0.439 0.475 
1913 0.572 1.712 0.457 0.498 0.567 1.704 0.457 0.495 
1914 0.568 1.708 0.450 0.493 0.550 1.699 0.426 0.474 
1915 0.606 1.754 0.480 0.532 0.588 1.748 0.449 0.511 
1916 0.637 1.814 0.479 0.561 0.614 1.809 0.437 0.533 
1917 0.655 1.836 0.498 0.583 0.635 1.836 0.454 0.557 
1918 0.604 1.779 0.452 0.528 0.584 1.779 0.407 0.501 
1919 0.586 1.792 0.401 0.504 0.560 1.792 0.343 0.469 
1920 0.572 1.749 0.417 0.493 0.549 1.749 0.366 0.463 
1921 0.567 1.729 0.439 0.496 0.549 1.729 0.397 0.472 
1922 0.551 1.704 0.433 0.481 0.535 1.704 0.395 0.459 
1923 0.552 1.703 0.435 0.481 0.536 1.703 0.399 0.461 
1924 0.573 1.726 0.453 0.503 0.558 1.726 0.417 0.482 
1925 0.576 1.729 0.459 0.507 0.560 1.729 0.423 0.487 
1926 0.561 1.701 0.471 0.501 0.549 1.701 0.441 0.484 
1927 0.547 1.679 0.472 0.490 0.536 1.679 0.446 0.476 
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1928 0.551 1.679 0.484 0.497 0.541 1.679 0.459 0.483 
1929 0.569 1.700 0.493 0.513 0.558 1.700 0.468 0.499 
1930 0.577 1.709 0.499 0.521 0.567 1.709 0.474 0.506 
1931 0.578 1.706 0.503 0.521 0.569 1.706 0.482 0.509 
1932 0.578 1.709 0.498 0.520 0.569 1.709 0.477 0.508 
1933 0.578 1.710 0.497 0.520 0.569 1.710 0.476 0.508 
1934 0.581 1.717 0.491 0.520 0.571 1.717 0.469 0.507 
1935 0.585 1.722 0.492 0.523 0.575 1.722 0.469 0.510 
1936 0.589 1.728 0.493 0.526 0.578 1.728 0.467 0.512 
1937 0.606 1.751 0.500 0.542 0.593 1.751 0.470 0.525 
1938 0.585 1.750 0.454 0.515 0.585 1.750 0.454 0.515 
1939 0.597 1.758 0.472 0.530 0.590 1.758 0.457 0.520 
1940 0.577 1.743 0.438 0.502 0.570 1.743 0.422 0.493 
1941 0.548 1.735 0.386 0.469 0.538 1.735 0.364 0.455 
1942 0.518 1.700 0.360 0.437 0.508 1.700 0.336 0.424 
1943 0.532 1.728 0.359 0.450 0.521 1.728 0.333 0.435 
1944 0.529 1.725 0.362 0.449 0.518 1.725 0.336 0.435 
1945 0.532 1.730 0.350 0.445 0.520 1.730 0.324 0.430 
1946 0.502 1.697 0.315 0.410 0.487 1.694 0.284 0.392 
1947 0.498 1.682 0.315 0.404 0.483 1.676 0.284 0.384 
1948 0.496 1.674 0.315 0.400 0.496 1.674 0.315 0.400 
1949 0.468 1.615 0.315 0.375 0.468 1.615 0.315 0.375 
1950 0.464 1.604 0.318 0.372 0.464 1.604 0.318 0.372 
1951 0.446 1.597 0.284 0.350 0.446 1.597 0.284 0.350 
1952 0.440 1.628 0.233 0.336 0.421 1.604 0.233 0.326 
1953 0.429 1.619 0.221 0.326 0.411 1.596 0.221 0.316 
1954 0.431 1.624 0.224 0.329 0.410 1.595 0.224 0.318 
1955 0.433 1.619 0.230 0.330 0.413 1.592 0.230 0.319 
1957 0.446 1.632 0.245 0.344 0.427 1.606 0.245 0.333 
1958 0.446 1.636 0.238 0.342 0.427 1.611 0.238 0.331 
1959 0.445 1.638 0.233 0.340 0.423 1.609 0.233 0.328 
1960 0.438 1.628 0.226 0.332 0.416 1.599 0.226 0.320 
1961 0.441 1.633 0.227 0.334 0.421 1.607 0.227 0.324 
1962 0.440 1.635 0.221 0.332 0.423 1.612 0.221 0.322 
1963 0.445 1.643 0.223 0.336 0.425 1.616 0.223 0.325 
1964 0.436 1.628 0.216 0.327 0.417 1.603 0.216 0.317 
1965 0.439 1.638 0.213 0.329 0.416 1.606 0.213 0.316 
1966 0.437 1.636 0.212 0.328 0.414 1.604 0.212 0.315 
1967 0.453 1.657 0.227 0.344 0.429 1.624 0.227 0.331 
1968 0.447 1.646 0.226 0.339 0.424 1.615 0.226 0.326 
1969 0.442 1.636 0.227 0.336 0.419 1.606 0.227 0.323 
1970 0.441 1.635 0.228 0.336 0.418 1.603 0.228 0.323 
1971 0.439 1.631 0.224 0.332 0.415 1.599 0.224 0.319 
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1972 0.437 1.629 0.223 0.331 0.414 1.598 0.223 0.318 
1973 0.437 1.629 0.223 0.331 0.414 1.599 0.223 0.319 
1974 0.436 1.630 0.220 0.329 0.413 1.599 0.220 0.317 
1975 0.440 1.639 0.217 0.331 0.417 1.608 0.217 0.319 
1976 0.433 1.628 0.211 0.324 0.412 1.599 0.211 0.312 
1977 0.425 1.615 0.209 0.317 0.404 1.586 0.209 0.306 
1978 0.419 1.604 0.209 0.313 0.397 1.575 0.209 0.301 
1979 0.414 1.596 0.207 0.309 0.393 1.568 0.207 0.298 
1980 0.406 1.584 0.203 0.302 0.386 1.558 0.203 0.291 
1981 0.406 1.584 0.205 0.303 0.385 1.556 0.205 0.291 
1982 0.408 1.585 0.208 0.305 0.386 1.556 0.208 0.293 
1983 0.413 1.592 0.212 0.310 0.388 1.559 0.212 0.296 
1984 0.415 1.595 0.216 0.313 0.390 1.562 0.216 0.300 
1985 0.416 1.594 0.220 0.315 0.392 1.562 0.220 0.302 
1986 0.417 1.593 0.224 0.316 0.393 1.561 0.224 0.303 
1987 0.419 1.595 0.227 0.319 0.398 1.566 0.227 0.307 
1988 0.418 1.591 0.229 0.318 0.397 1.563 0.229 0.307 
1989 0.410 1.578 0.232 0.314 0.392 1.556 0.232 0.305 
1990 0.415 1.584 0.235 0.319 0.397 1.562 0.235 0.310 
1991 0.420 1.592 0.242 0.326 0.401 1.567 0.242 0.316 
1992 0.437 1.605 0.271 0.346 0.415 1.577 0.271 0.335 
1993 0.450 1.615 0.290 0.361 0.430 1.589 0.290 0.350 
1994 0.453 1.618 0.294 0.364 0.434 1.594 0.294 0.354 
1995 0.450 1.614 0.293 0.362 0.433 1.592 0.293 0.353 
1996 0.452 1.612 0.297 0.364 0.435 1.592 0.297 0.355 
1997 0.455 1.613 0.303 0.368 0.440 1.595 0.303 0.359 
1998 0.444 1.600 0.296 0.358 0.428 1.580 0.296 0.349 
1999 0.446 1.600 0.301 0.360 0.429 1.579 0.301 0.351 
2000 0.464 1.615 0.325 0.380 0.447 1.594 0.325 0.371 
2001 0.444 1.600 0.296 0.358 0.426 1.577 0.296 0.348 
2002 0.462 1.614 0.323 0.378 0.444 1.591 0.323 0.368 
2003 0.470 1.621 0.334 0.387 0.451 1.597 0.334 0.377 
2004 0.478 1.629 0.343 0.396 0.460 1.605 0.343 0.385 
2005 0.516 1.658 0.397 0.439 0.497 1.635 0.397 0.428 
2006 0.457 1.615 0.308 0.371 0.437 1.590 0.308 0.360 
2007 0.467 1.624 0.322 0.383 0.447 1.599 0.322 0.371 
2008 0.460 1.616 0.317 0.376 0.438 1.588 0.317 0.364 
2009 0.460 1.621 0.312 0.376 0.434 1.588 0.312 0.361 
2010 0.465 1.626 0.319 0.381 0.438 1.591 0.319 0.366 
2011 0.463 1.626 0.312 0.378 0.439 1.595 0.312 0.364 
2012 0.465 1.628 0.313 0.379 0.440 1.596 0.313 0.365 
2013 0.467 1.631 0.316 0.382 0.442 1.598 0.316 0.368 
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Table A 2: Number of individuals and mean incomes, by group, and control totals. Nominal values in 
NOK (not CPI adjusted)  
   Number of individuals Mean income 
         NA/NT  
Year 
Population 
control 
Income 
control 
(Mill 
NOK) 
CG14 
taxpayers 
MUN-CG 
taxpayers NA/NT Poor 
CG 
taxpayers 
MUN-
CG 
taxpayers 
(Upper 
Gini 
bound) 
(Lower 
Gini 
bound) Poor 
1875 847 000 476 184 053 521 407 83 730 57 810 1 225 230 85 150 85 
1888 919 000 442 65 845 410 098 365 502 77 555 2 537 345 76 150 76 
1892 937 870 490 176 075 342 860 340 254 78 681 1 450 277 85 92 85 
1893 944 840 500 102 542 421 050 340 318 80 930 2 039 338 83 113 83 
1894 955 117 503 66 807 468 322 339 239 80 749 2 709 383 85 128 85 
1895 968 945 514 68 227 476 723 345 533 78 462 2 712 387 93 129 93 
1896 983 818 538 70 454 492 729 340 393 80 242 2 696 397 90 132 90 
1897 999 315 559 75 578 505 845 337 693 80 199 2 700 401 91 134 91 
1898 1 015 808 606 83 933 520 295 331 403 80 177 2 698 408 94 136 94 
1899 1 031 501 639 91 422 521 528 337 821 80 730 2 669 419 95 140 95 
1900 1 045 420 667 94 367 531 711 341 090 78 252 2 683 425 106 142 106 
1901 1 058 452 657 95 767 548 176 332 368 82 141 2 625 427 108 142 108 
1902 1 066 877 652 97 517 556 891 329 077 83 392 2 588 428 108 143 108 
1903 1 071 397 648 96 431 557 972 330 361 86 634 2 574 428 107 143 107 
1904 1 065 571 638 100 380 560 810 316 199 88 182 2 464 428 109 143 109 
1905 1 070 722 654 99 463 569 071 318 628 83 560 2 537 426 118 142 118 
1906 1 077 000 708 105 145 573 059 315 190 83 606 2 535 430 116 143 116 
1907 1 088 673 749 113 288 577 144 315 810 82 431 2 519 433 116 144 116 
1908 1 084 270 770 124 027 583 412 294 056 82 775 2 462 435 119 145 119 
1909 1 102 688 784 130 278 589 821 298 630 83 959 2 472 437 117 146 117 
1910 1 119 676 866 140 864 591 294 307 841 79 677 2 459 445 127 148 127 
1911 1 122 989 920 153 321 599 031 290 504 80 133 2 462 457 127 152 127 
1912 1 138 014 1 017 237 787 570 380 252 307 77 540 2 292 501 139 167 139 
1913 1 181 740 1 130 256 299 586 611 261 662 77 168 2 486 498 149 166 149 
1914 1 198 991 1 165 277 668 589 343 254 034 77 947 2 491 517 147 172 147 
1915 1 191 118 1 590 315 126 570 701 230 296 74 995 3 241 546 159 182 159 
1916 1 213 725 2 344 403 017 516 477 220 729 73 502 4 842 624 178 208 178 
1917 1 234 220 2 785 414 844 561 408 188 332 69 636 6 040 574 224 224 224 
1918 1 257 369 3 196 448 653 549 757 192 108 66 851 6 001 875 298 298 298 
1919 1 274 625 3 890 556 348 476 176 179 495 62 606 5 959 819 395 395 395 
1920 1 297 828 4 702 512 180 528 326 201 062 56 260 6 439 1 120 494 494 494 
1921 1 320 416 3 512 448 155 521 486 285 654 65 122 5 161 974 507 507 507 
1922 1 341 487 3 170 424 732 542 246 301 006 73 503 4 506 957 492 492 492 
1923 1 359 382 3 140 412 585 561 104 309 925 75 768 4 317 933 469 469 469 
                                                     
14 The Mun-CG divison for 1875 and 1888 has been discussed in the subsection “Using data on the assisted poor”. 
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1924 1 366 009 3 468 407 816 580 535 296 892 80 766 4 543 868 462 462 462 
1925 1 382 259 3 491 409 671 581 312 305 945 85 331 4 578 848 480 480 480 
1926 1 401 352 2 869 360 762 618 748 324 945 96 897 4 444 821 482 482 482 
1927 1 416 889 2 587 332 276 644 336 332 594 107 683 4 248 797 485 485 485 
1928 1 429 250 2 583 323 486 661 957 337 679 106 127 4 180 738 492 492 492 
1929 1 455 069 2 656 330 210 668 110 348 444 108 305 4 252 713 451 451 451 
1930 1 462 006 2 701 328 673 680 495 342 738 110 100 4 279 693 434 434 434 
1931 1 484 265 2 331 290 127 704 092 364 673 125 373 4 220 682 371 371 371 
1932 1 500 824 2 324 297 978 700 192 357 232 145 423 3 989 663 359 359 359 
1933 1 520 458 2 323 300 982 706 177 360 450 152 850 3 878 649 352 352 352 
1934 1 543 222 2 450 315 183 704 531 366 504 157 003 3 820 662 347 347 347 
1935 1 565 806 2 627 330 193 712 185 365 219 158 209 3 922 673 354 354 354 
1936 1 583 790 2 919 365 267 723 020 339 260 156 242 4 053 679 371 371 371 
1937 1 610 577 3 372 409 369 717 636 334 786 148 786 4 366 672 378 378 378 
1938 1 632 718 3 497 444 099 700 914 347 219 140 486 4 424 716 387 387 387 
1939 1 654 129 3 755 471 654 712 892 331 743 137 840 4 498 670 406 406 406 
1940 1 674 238 4 019 517 468 730 297 275 149 151 324 4 388 771 377 377 377 
1941 1 688 313 5 134 664 652 653 608 278 337 91 716 4 530 828 523 523 523 
1942 1 695 121 5 137 711 786 637 713 281 683 63 939 4 505 965 576 576 576 
1943 1 704 634 5 223 739 956 618 432 291 888 54 358 4 623 868 555 555 555 
1944 1 716 464 5 198 739 897 612 073 315 106 49 388 4 619 857 613 613 613 
1945 1 730 001 6 330 768 327 596 787 315 131 49 756 4 599 918 576 576 576 
1946 1 746 103 6 303 917 116 442 106 336 076 50 805 4 908 1 041 662 662 662 
1947 1 752 946 7 456 979 409 416 528 308 940 48 069 5 572 1 081 733 733 733 
1948 1 736 464 8 209 1 006 112 401 233 284 421 44 698 6 220 1 114 795 795 795 
1949 1 733 690 8 800 1 076 360 372 694 243 250 41 386 6 266 1 382 835 835 835 
1950 1 727 813 9 463 1 125 158 351 160 212 229 39 266 6 621 1 338 845 845 845 
1951 1 721 099 11 472 1 026 214 455 814 199 979 39 092 8 156 2 091 908 908 908 
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Table A 3: Population and income control totals 1951 and later 
Year 
Population 
control 
Income 
control Year 
Population 
control 
Income 
control Year 
Population 
control 
Income 
control 
1951 1 721 099  11 472  1973 1 970 938  64 933  1994 2 553 029  475 796  
1952 1 723 350  12 556  1974 1 989 957  74 603  1995 2 571 878  500 651  
1953 1 723 163  12 760  1975 2 009 594  86 418  1996 2 590 583  526 145  
1954 1 723 981  14 055  1976 2 032 203  98 343  1997 2 608 585  558 102  
1955 1 725 450  14 826  1977 2 052 434  108 545  1998 2 629 277  612 113  
1957 1 741 998  17 685  1978 2 076 830  128 727  1999 2 652 168  649 219  
1958 1 748 932 17 301 1979 2 100 389  137 116  2000 2 668 561  697 332  
1959 1 758 814  18 382  1980 2 126 458  156 663  2001 2 683 319  731 486  
1960 1 771 109  19 601  1981 2 158 775  178 977  2002 2 705 535  789 216  
1961 1 788 908  21 349  1982 2 190 717  201 213  2003 2 726 116  828 107  
1962 1 809 911  22 996  1983 2 222 341  221 096  2004 2 752 110  854 120  
1963 1 833 869  24 916  1984 2 254 414  244 354  2005 2 786 213  918 359  
1964 1 854 113  27 564  1985 2 293 666  268 342  2006 2 825 535  908 676  
1965 1 872 800  30 590  1986 2 330 892  303 474  2007 2 879 690  1 005 373  
1966 1 889 704  32 847  1987 2 367 549  343 704  2008 2 933 108  1 110 046  
1967 1 904 805  35 865  1988 2 402 329  370 905  2009 2 979 837  1 138 789  
1968 1 885 438  38 272  1989 2 425 794  387 500  2010 3 035 119  1 184 684  
1969 1 900 571  41 543  1990 2 450 457  408 447  2011 2 944 064  1 260 426  
1970 1 914 912  47 014  1991 2 480 929  428 316  2012 2 999 539  1 331 274  
1971 1 934 029  52 095  1992 2 508 283  449 394  2013 3 051 514  1 402 008  
1972 1 950 723  57 432  1993 2 533 015  466 137  
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Table A 4: Parameters used for the calculation of four-class Gini. For calculation, see text. Note: 
G**=0.1333 (from z=0.4) for all years 
 Same for upper and lower bound Upper bound Lower bound 
Year p n m c A h g g' G* h g g' G* 
1875 0.068 0.099 0.616 0.217 0.010 0.025 0.364 0.338 0.494 0.037 0.371 0.335 0.494 
1888 0.084 0.398 0.446 0.072 0.013 0.076 0.499 0.424 0.461 0.137 0.533 0.395 0.461 
1892 0.084 0.363 0.366 0.188 0.014 0.072 0.324 0.252 0.448 0.078 0.328 0.250 0.448 
1893 0.086 0.360 0.446 0.109 0.013 0.070 0.447 0.377 0.452 0.090 0.459 0.369 0.452 
1894 0.085 0.355 0.490 0.070 0.014 0.071 0.533 0.463 0.447 0.100 0.548 0.448 0.447 
1895 0.081 0.357 0.492 0.070 0.014 0.077 0.538 0.461 0.485 0.101 0.550 0.449 0.485 
1896 0.082 0.346 0.501 0.072 0.013 0.070 0.542 0.472 0.480 0.097 0.555 0.458 0.480 
1897 0.080 0.338 0.506 0.076 0.013 0.068 0.532 0.465 0.488 0.094 0.545 0.452 0.488 
1898 0.079 0.326 0.512 0.083 0.012 0.064 0.517 0.453 0.494 0.087 0.529 0.442 0.494 
1899 0.078 0.328 0.506 0.089 0.012 0.062 0.505 0.443 0.492 0.086 0.518 0.432 0.492 
1900 0.075 0.326 0.509 0.090 0.012 0.067 0.507 0.440 0.495 0.085 0.517 0.432 0.495 
1901 0.078 0.314 0.518 0.090 0.013 0.068 0.517 0.449 0.481 0.085 0.526 0.441 0.481 
1902 0.078 0.308 0.522 0.091 0.014 0.069 0.521 0.453 0.473 0.086 0.530 0.444 0.473 
1903 0.081 0.308 0.521 0.090 0.014 0.069 0.525 0.456 0.469 0.087 0.534 0.447 0.469 
1904 0.083 0.297 0.526 0.094 0.015 0.069 0.527 0.458 0.469 0.086 0.536 0.450 0.456 
1905 0.078 0.298 0.531 0.093 0.015 0.073 0.527 0.455 0.469 0.084 0.533 0.449 0.456 
1906 0.078 0.293 0.532 0.098 0.014 0.065 0.514 0.449 0.456 0.077 0.520 0.443 0.456 
1907 0.076 0.290 0.530 0.104 0.013 0.062 0.500 0.438 0.456 0.074 0.506 0.432 0.353 
1908 0.076 0.271 0.538 0.114 0.013 0.058 0.486 0.428 0.456 0.068 0.491 0.423 0.353 
1909 0.076 0.271 0.535 0.118 0.013 0.057 0.476 0.419 0.456 0.068 0.482 0.414 0.353 
1910 0.071 0.275 0.528 0.126 0.012 0.057 0.464 0.407 0.456 0.064 0.468 0.404 0.353 
1911 0.071 0.259 0.533 0.137 0.011 0.051 0.450 0.399 0.456 0.059 0.455 0.395 0.353 
1912 0.068 0.222 0.501 0.209 0.011 0.045 0.374 0.328 0.456 0.052 0.378 0.326 0.353 
1913 0.065 0.221 0.496 0.217 0.010 0.045 0.345 0.300 0.353 0.049 0.348 0.299 0.353 
1914 0.065 0.212 0.492 0.232 0.010 0.042 0.335 0.293 0.353 0.047 0.338 0.291 0.284 
1915 0.063 0.193 0.479 0.265 0.008 0.031 0.257 0.226 0.353 0.034 0.260 0.226 0.284 
1916 0.061 0.182 0.426 0.332 0.006 0.022 0.161 0.138 0.353 0.025 0.163 0.138 0.284 
1917 0.056 0.153 0.455 0.336 0.006 0.021 0.132 0.112 0.353 0.021 0.132 0.112 0.284 
1918 0.053 0.153 0.437 0.357 0.006 0.024 0.172 0.148 0.353 0.024 0.172 0.148 0.284 
1919 0.049 0.141 0.374 0.436 0.006 0.025 0.127 0.103 0.353 0.025 0.127 0.103 0.284 
1920 0.043 0.155 0.407 0.395 0.006 0.027 0.175 0.148 0.353 0.027 0.175 0.148 0.284 
1921 0.049 0.216 0.395 0.339 0.009 0.051 0.222 0.171 0.353 0.051 0.222 0.171 0.284 
1922 0.055 0.224 0.404 0.317 0.011 0.058 0.259 0.201 0.353 0.058 0.259 0.201 0.284 
1923 0.056 0.228 0.413 0.304 0.011 0.058 0.272 0.214 0.353 0.058 0.272 0.214 0.284 
1924 0.059 0.217 0.425 0.299 0.011 0.050 0.253 0.203 0.353 0.050 0.253 0.203 0.284 
1925 0.062 0.221 0.421 0.296 0.012 0.054 0.251 0.197 0.353 0.054 0.251 0.197 0.284 
1926 0.069 0.232 0.442 0.257 0.016 0.071 0.294 0.224 0.353 0.071 0.294 0.224 0.284 
1927 0.076 0.235 0.455 0.235 0.020 0.083 0.327 0.245 0.353 0.083 0.327 0.245 0.284 
1928 0.074 0.236 0.463 0.226 0.020 0.084 0.327 0.243 0.353 0.084 0.327 0.243 0.284 
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1929 0.074 0.239 0.459 0.227 0.018 0.078 0.311 0.234 0.353 0.078 0.311 0.234 0.284 
1930 0.075 0.234 0.465 0.225 0.018 0.073 0.306 0.233 0.353 0.073 0.306 0.233 0.284 
1931 0.084 0.246 0.474 0.195 0.020 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.353 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.284 
1932 0.097 0.238 0.467 0.199 0.022 0.078 0.337 0.259 0.353 0.078 0.337 0.259 0.284 
1933 0.101 0.237 0.464 0.198 0.023 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.353 0.078 0.338 0.260 0.284 
1934 0.102 0.237 0.457 0.204 0.022 0.074 0.333 0.258 0.353 0.074 0.333 0.258 0.284 
1935 0.101 0.233 0.455 0.211 0.021 0.071 0.322 0.251 0.353 0.071 0.322 0.251 0.284 
1936 0.099 0.214 0.457 0.231 0.020 0.063 0.296 0.233 0.353 0.063 0.296 0.233 0.284 
1937 0.092 0.208 0.446 0.254 0.017 0.054 0.255 0.201 0.353 0.054 0.255 0.201 0.284 
1938 0.086 0.213 0.429 0.272 0.016 0.054 0.246 0.192 0.284 0.054 0.246 0.192 0.284 
1939 0.083 0.201 0.431 0.285 0.015 0.051 0.225 0.174 0.315 0.051 0.225 0.174 0.284 
1940 0.090 0.164 0.436 0.309 0.014 0.040 0.231 0.191 0.315 0.040 0.231 0.191 0.284 
1941 0.054 0.165 0.387 0.394 0.009 0.038 0.184 0.147 0.315 0.038 0.184 0.147 0.284 
1942 0.038 0.166 0.376 0.420 0.007 0.039 0.193 0.155 0.315 0.039 0.193 0.155 0.284 
1943 0.032 0.171 0.363 0.434 0.006 0.037 0.167 0.131 0.315 0.037 0.167 0.131 0.284 
1944 0.029 0.184 0.357 0.431 0.006 0.043 0.170 0.127 0.315 0.043 0.170 0.127 0.284 
1945 0.029 0.182 0.345 0.444 0.005 0.033 0.163 0.130 0.315 0.033 0.163 0.130 0.284 
1946 0.029 0.192 0.253 0.525 0.005 0.041 0.130 0.089 0.315 0.041 0.130 0.089 0.284 
1947 0.027 0.176 0.238 0.559 0.005 0.035 0.109 0.074 0.315 0.035 0.109 0.074 0.284 
1948 0.026 0.164 0.231 0.579 0.004 0.032 0.096 0.065 0.315 0.032 0.096 0.065 0.315 
1949 0.024 0.140 0.215 0.621 0.004 0.027 0.096 0.069 0.315 0.027 0.096 0.069 0.315 
1950 0.023 0.123 0.203 0.651 0.004 0.022 0.080 0.058 0.318 0.022 0.080 0.058 0.318 
1951 0.023 0.116 0.265 0.596 0.003 0.019 0.119 0.100 0.284 0.019 0.119 0.100 0.284 
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Table A 5: Mean of upper and lower bound and Gini (above median)/Affluence measures 
year 
Gini coefficient  
(average) 
Gini  
above median) 
𝜇𝜇𝑈𝑈
𝜇𝜇
 Affluence  
1892 0.640 0.515 1.802 0.577 
1893 0.619 0.491 1.781 0.552 
1894 0.593 0.461 1.757 0.522 
1895 0.588 0.462 1.747 0.518 
1896 0.584 0.454 1.744 0.512 
1897 0.585 0.460 1.740 0.513 
1898 0.588 0.467 1.738 0.516 
1899 0.591 0.469 1.742 0.519 
1900 0.586 0.469 1.734 0.515 
1901 0.574 0.459 1.719 0.503 
1902 0.568 0.454 1.712 0.496 
1903 0.567 0.451 1.712 0.495 
1904 0.559 0.444 1.701 0.486 
1905 0.558 0.450 1.697 0.486 
1906 0.566 0.453 1.706 0.493 
1907 0.569 0.452 1.710 0.495 
1908 0.565 0.454 1.701 0.492 
1909 0.569 0.458 1.704 0.495 
1910 0.572 0.461 1.709 0.499 
1911 0.572 0.461 1.706 0.497 
1912 0.561 0.455 1.692 0.487 
1913 0.570 0.457 1.708 0.496 
1914 0.559 0.438 1.704 0.483 
1915 0.597 0.465 1.751 0.522 
1916 0.626 0.458 1.812 0.547 
1917 0.645 0.476 1.836 0.570 
1918 0.594 0.430 1.779 0.514 
1919 0.573 0.372 1.792 0.486 
1920 0.560 0.391 1.749 0.478 
1921 0.558 0.418 1.729 0.484 
1922 0.543 0.414 1.704 0.470 
1923 0.544 0.417 1.703 0.471 
1924 0.565 0.435 1.726 0.492 
1925 0.568 0.441 1.729 0.497 
1926 0.555 0.456 1.701 0.492 
1927 0.542 0.459 1.679 0.483 
1928 0.546 0.471 1.679 0.490 
1929 0.564 0.480 1.700 0.506 
1930 0.572 0.486 1.709 0.513 
1931 0.573 0.492 1.706 0.515 
1932 0.573 0.488 1.709 0.514 
1933 0.574 0.487 1.710 0.514 
1934 0.576 0.480 1.717 0.514 
1935 0.580 0.481 1.722 0.517 
1936 0.583 0.480 1.728 0.519 
1937 0.599 0.485 1.751 0.533 
1938 0.585 0.454 1.750 0.515 
48 
 
1939 0.594 0.464 1.758 0.525 
1940 0.574 0.430 1.743 0.498 
1941 0.543 0.375 1.735 0.462 
1942 0.513 0.348 1.700 0.431 
1943 0.526 0.346 1.728 0.442 
1944 0.524 0.349 1.725 0.442 
1945 0.526 0.337 1.730 0.438 
1946 0.494 0.300 1.695 0.401 
1947 0.491 0.300 1.679 0.394 
1948 0.496 0.315 1.674 0.400 
1949 0.468 0.315 1.615 0.375 
1950 0.464 0.318 1.604 0.372 
1951 0.446 0.284 1.597 0.350 
1952 0.430 0.233 1.616 0.331 
1953 0.420 0.221 1.608 0.321 
1954 0.421 0.224 1.609 0.324 
1955 0.423 0.230 1.606 0.325 
1957 0.437 0.245 1.619 0.339 
1958 0.437 0.238 1.623 0.336 
1959 0.434 0.233 1.623 0.334 
1960 0.427 0.226 1.614 0.326 
1961 0.432 0.227 1.620 0.329 
1962 0.432 0.221 1.623 0.327 
1963 0.436 0.223 1.629 0.331 
1964 0.426 0.216 1.616 0.322 
1965 0.428 0.213 1.622 0.323 
1966 0.425 0.212 1.620 0.321 
1967 0.441 0.227 1.641 0.338 
1968 0.435 0.226 1.630 0.333 
1969 0.431 0.227 1.621 0.330 
1970 0.430 0.228 1.619 0.329 
1971 0.427 0.224 1.615 0.326 
1972 0.425 0.223 1.614 0.324 
1973 0.426 0.223 1.614 0.325 
1974 0.425 0.220 1.615 0.323 
1975 0.429 0.217 1.624 0.325 
1976 0.422 0.211 1.614 0.318 
1977 0.414 0.209 1.600 0.311 
1978 0.408 0.209 1.589 0.307 
1979 0.404 0.207 1.582 0.303 
1980 0.396 0.203 1.571 0.296 
1981 0.396 0.205 1.570 0.297 
1982 0.397 0.208 1.571 0.299 
1983 0.400 0.212 1.576 0.303 
1984 0.403 0.216 1.579 0.306 
1985 0.404 0.220 1.578 0.308 
1986 0.405 0.224 1.577 0.310 
1987 0.409 0.227 1.580 0.313 
1988 0.407 0.229 1.577 0.313 
1989 0.401 0.232 1.567 0.310 
1990 0.406 0.235 1.573 0.314 
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1991 0.411 0.242 1.580 0.321 
1992 0.426 0.271 1.591 0.341 
1993 0.440 0.290 1.602 0.356 
1994 0.443 0.294 1.606 0.359 
1995 0.442 0.293 1.603 0.357 
1996 0.444 0.297 1.602 0.360 
1997 0.447 0.303 1.604 0.364 
1998 0.436 0.296 1.590 0.353 
1999 0.437 0.301 1.589 0.356 
2000 0.456 0.325 1.605 0.376 
2001 0.435 0.296 1.588 0.353 
2002 0.453 0.323 1.602 0.373 
2003 0.461 0.334 1.609 0.382 
2004 0.469 0.343 1.617 0.391 
2005 0.506 0.397 1.647 0.433 
2006 0.447 0.308 1.603 0.366 
2007 0.457 0.322 1.611 0.377 
2008 0.449 0.317 1.602 0.370 
2009 0.447 0.312 1.604 0.369 
2010 0.451 0.319 1.608 0.374 
2011 0.451 0.312 1.611 0.371 
2012 0.452 0.313 1.612 0.372 
2013 0.454 0.316 1.615 0.375 
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Figure A 1: Mean income above the median relative to the overall mean 
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Appendix B: Sources of tabulated income tax data 
The two income tax sources are the basis for the tabulations of taxpayers by income ranges from 1948 
to 1966, which precede the micro-data available from 1967. As noted in the text, the number paying 
MUN tax exceeds that paying CG tax. In the tabulations (HS 1978, Tabell 314), income is equal to 
assessed income by the central government tax assessment for the years 1948-51, and assessed income 
by municipal tax assessment for the years 1952-55. This accounts for the jump in the number of 
taxpayers and the amount of assessed income in 1952, from 947,842 CG taxpayers in 1951 to 
1,412,873 MUN taxpayers in 1952 (an increase of 49 per cent), and from 7,993 mNOK to 10,227 
mNOK in 1952 (an increase of 28 per cent). The smaller percentage increase in total income reflects 
the fact that those paying MUN but not CG, a group referred to as (MUN-CG) here, have lower 
average incomes. In the tabulations for the years 1957 to 1966, income is defined as assessed income 
by the central government tax assessment if central government tax is levied. If not, income is defined 
as assessed income by the municipal tax assessment.  
 
The sources for years before 1948 are listed in Table A 6. 
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Table A 6: Sources of tabulated income data  
Year Source Taxpayer 
categories 
Number of 
taxpayers 
Number of 
groups 
1875 Skattelikningen 1876 (A.N. Kiær - 1892-93, 
p. 110-113, included tax free incomes and 
Oth.Prp. nr. 11 for 1881 p. 20-25 
MUN 705 460 33 
1888 Sth. Prp. Nr. 48. (1890), p.42 and 122 MUN 472 104 9 
1892 Oth. Prp. No. 39 CG 176 142 8 
1893 Sth. Prp. No 91 CG 102 542 6 
1894 Sth. Prp. No. 112 CG 66 807 5 
1895 Sth. Prp. No. 104 CG 68 233 14 
1896 Sth. Prp. No. 89 CG 70 454 14 
1897 Statsskattens fordeling 1892/93-1898/99 CG 75 578 14 
1898 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 94 587 15 
1899 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 91 422 14 
1900 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 94 367 14 
1901 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 95 767 14 
1902 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 97 517 14 
1903 Statsskattens fordeling 1899/00-1905/06 CG 96 431 14 
1906 Rygg, 1910, pages 50 and 69  677 487 17 
1913 NOS VI.57, page 30*  774 308 12 
1938 Stat Medd 1941, no 11 and 12, page 333  410 020 26 
1948-
1951 
HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 CG Lowest: 954 524  
Highest: 1 047 
017 
25 
1952-
1955 
HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 MUN Lowest: 1 396 
738  
Highest: 1 439 
770 
25 
1957-
1966 
HS1978, Table 314, page 572-573 MUN and CG Lowest: 1 372 
298  
Highest: 1 543 
022 
25 
1967 -  Administrative microdata    
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Appendix C: Control Totals for total tax units and total income 
Control totals: adults and tax units 
The adult population is defined as those aged 16 and over. The data from 1948 onwards were supplied 
by Statistics Norway. For the period before 1948, data on the population by age is available from 
Historical Statistics 1994, Table 3.5, for 5 year intervals. We took the data for 31 December of year (t-
1) as applying to year t, so that the data cover years ending in 1 or 6. From these, we calculated the 
proportion of the population aged 16 and over, and interpolated linearly for the intervening years. The 
percentages were then applied to the mean annual population figures given in Historical Statistics 
1978, Table 9.  
 
Total tax units are obtained by subtracting the number of married women. The number of married 
women is given at 5 year intervals in Historical Statistics 1994, Tabell 3.7. These are expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population and the percentages linearly interpolated. The results are shown in 
Table A2. 
Control totals: household income 
For total income, the starting point is a series for total household income as measured in the national 
accounts provided for 1978 to 2006 by Statistics Norway. Total household income is made up of (i) 
compensation of employees (not including employers’ social security contributions), (ii) operating 
surplus of self-employed businesses, (iii) property income, (iv) transfers from government and from 
abroad, and (v) income not elsewhere classified. In order to extrapolate this series backwards, we have 
made use of series that are as comparable as possible, given the available materials from HS 1994 and 
earlier editions. In each case, the series have been linked at years where the estimates seem most 
comparable (for this reason we have started with 1979, rather than 1978). So that if the 1979 value 
from the Statistics Norway series is A1979, and first linked series is for 1975 to 1979, given by 
B1975, …, B1979, then for 1978 we take the value of B1978, multiplied by A1979/B1979.  
 
Working backwards to 1950, we have used the Nasjonalregnskap 1968-1979, Tabell 33, pages 138-
139 for the New Definition of Private Income for 1968 to 1978. For 1950 to 1968, we have used the 
Old Definition of Private Income from Historisk statistikk 1978 (Statistics Norway, 1978), Tabell 59 
(page 104) for 1965 to 1968 and from Historisk statistikk 1968, Tabell 70 (pages 110-111) for 1950 to 
1964. In each case employers’ social security contributions were subtracted from the total of private 
income; these were taken from Nasjonalregnskap 1969-1980, Tabell 30 (for 1969 to 1974), 
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Nasjonalregnskap 1962-1978, Tabell 29 (for 1962 to 1968), Nasjonalregnskap 1953-1969, Tabell 14 
(for 1953 to 1961), and Nasjonalregnskap 1968-1979, Tabell 14 (for 1950 to 1952).  
 
For years prior to 1950, we use for 1930 to 1950 Nasjonalregnskap 1865-1960 (NOS XII 163), Tabell 
24, adding Direct taxes paid to Private disposable income. This source does not give figures for 1940 
to 1945, and we have interpolated for 1940 to 1943 using the net real income figure in Tabell 35 of 
Statistiske oversikter 1948 (NOS X 178). No figures are given for 1944 and 1945. For years prior to 
1930, the main source is Langtidslinjer i Norsk Økonomi 1865-1960, Tabell VIII, where we have 
taken the sum of Private income from labour and capital and Transfers from government and Transfers 
from abroad. This source provides annual estimates from 1865 to 1900. For the period 1900 to 1930, 
the estimates are given at 5 yearly intervals. The figures for intermediate years have been interpolated 
using the series for “private gross income” from Nasjonalregnskap 1900-1929 (NOS XI 143), Tabell 
7.  
The resulting series for total household income as measured in the national accounts exceeds the total 
income recorded in the tax statistics (the internal total) for three main reasons: (i) the omission of the 
income of those not covered by the tax statistics, (ii) understatement of income in the tax statistics, and 
(iii) differences in income definitions. In order to allow for the last of these, Aaberge and Atkinson 
(2010) took as the control total 72 per cent of the national accounts figure. We follow the same 
practice here. The resulting figures are given in Table A2.  
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Figure A 2 shows the internal total as a percentage of the control total over the period 1875 to 2011. 
As may be seen, the relationship differs between the periods before and after 1952. Before 1952, 
leaving aside the years of the First World War, the internal total was around 80 per cent of the control 
total. After 1952, the relation was much more variable and closer to 100 per cent on average.  
 
Figure A 2: Internal total as share of Control total 
 
Source: National accounts (Control total) and calculations from tax and poverty statistics (Internal total) 
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Appendix D: Source of aggregate statistics on taxpayers and poor 
The source of the aggregate number of taxpayers and total assessed income (before the adjustment 
from all taxpayers to personal taxpayers) is displayed in Table A 7. 
Table A 7: Sources of data on municipal and central government taxpayers 
Years Municipal tax aggregates Central government tax aggregates 
1875 and 1888 See Appendix B (Detailed sources) Not applicable 
1892-1899 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1902, Table 99 
1900 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1906, Table 104 
1901 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1907, Table 104 
1902 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1908, Table 108 
1903-1908 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1909, Table 108 
1909-1914 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1915, Table 112A 
1915-1916 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1918, Table 124 
1917-1919 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1920, Table 143a 
1920 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1921, Table 160 
1921 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1924, Table 179 
1922-1923 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1926/1927, Table 178 
1924-1926 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1929, Table 199 
1927-1936 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 Statistical Yearbook 1940, Table 267 
1937-1945 Historical Statistics 1948, Table 220 NOS Tax Statistics * 
1946-1953 Historical Statistics 1958, Table 200 NOS Tax Statistics * 
* NOS tax statistics are annual publications; numbers for year t are reported  
in the publication with title "t+1/t+2" i.e. "NOS Skattestatistikk for budsjettåret  
1938/39" have data for 1937 and so on. 
 
One problem in using these statistics is to restrict the coverage to personal taxpayers, by excluding 
non-personal taxpayers a group that “comprises joint-stock companies, co-operative societies and 
other corporations” (HS 1968, page 428). This applies to the tax data between 1921 and 1947 (from 
1948 onwards we have separate reports on personal taxpayers and total taxpayers). For most years 
between 1937 and 1947, we have separate reports of the totals and interpolate the missing years using 
the ratio between personal and all taxpayers. There is little year-to-year variation in this ratio. For this 
reason, we use the 1937 ratio to impute the share of personal taxpayers (and their income) for the 
1921-1936 period. For municipal taxpayers, this amounts to multiplying the total number of taxpayers 
by 0.937 and total income by 0.855. For central government taxpayers, the corresponding numbers are 
0.973 and 0.848. 
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Data on the number of supported poor and the total poverty support 1875-1951 is obtained from the 
annually published poverty statistics. An overview of data for every fifth year is found in Historical 
Statistics 1994, Table 7.8.  
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Appendix E: Adjustments to tabulated data 1952 to 1966 
From 1952 to 1966 the income distributions used in this paper are obtained from detailed tables in 
Historical Statistics 1978 (HS1978 henceforth). (There are also tables for 1948-1951 on the same 
pages, but these are CG taxpayers only and hence cover a lower share of the population. They are used 
to calculate G* for these years in the 4-class tables). Some adjustments to these data are required to 
make the time series consistent with the period up until 1951 and the micro data from 1967 onwards.  
Adjustment for sailor taxation 
A separate sailor taxation was introduced in 1948 based on a law from 1947. Sailors are not included 
in the HS1978 detailed tables. We add sailors to these tables. From 1956 onward we have the number 
of sailors and their mean income from HS1978 table 308. Before 1956 we use the tax statistics, or 
HS1978 table 307 which shows total sailor taxes paid, and deduce the numbers from that. We use an 
uniform distribution on (0, 2*sailor mean inc) for sailor incomes and add these to the tables 1951-
1966. 
 
To apply the changes, the tabular data is re-grouped into 100 percentiles with mean incomes and 
population sizes. The same is done to the sailors; the tables are then added. For the spouses a 
transformation algorithm is applied based on registry data from 1967, where we observe spouses 
individually as well as a variable informing us about whether they chose to be taxed separately or not. 
This is described in detail in the next paragraph. 
Treatment of married couples 
Until 1960 married women are always taxed with their husband. From 1960, married couples could 
elect to be taxed separately. They are then included as two separate individuals in the tabulations. In 
the registry data (available from 1967) we can identify, on the individual level, which individuals were 
separately taxed. Hence, we can construct tabulation of units both by taxation status (as in HS1978) 
and by couples jointly (our preferred population, and the one used in tabulations before 1960). In this 
section we describe how we use information from the registry data to construct a conversion algorithm 
that we apply to the 1960-1966 tabulations, and in this way increase the comparability of the data. 
In the 1967 income file, we observe 115,753 couples that are definitely separately taxed. These are 
mainly couples where both have high incomes, as shown in Figure A 3, which gives the share of 
couples that are separately taxed, by wife's and husband's income. The darkest shade denotes that more 
than 80% with this income combination is separately taxed, while the lightest shade denotes less than 
20%. White means that there are few individuals with this income combination. 
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Figure A 3: Percentage of couples taxed separately in Norway, by husband and wife's income, 1967 
 
 
In 1960, we have no registry data on incomes, but the Census of 1960 has information on the "main 
source of livelihood" for individuals and is available in registry form. The variable "main source of 
livelihood" has three possible values: 
1. Income from own work 
2. Pensions / transfers / income from wealth / loan / scholarships etc 
3. Income from someone else's work (supported) 
 
For married women, most are in category 3, while most married men are in category 1 (all 
combinations exist). There are around 45000 married couples where both the husband and wife are in 
category 1. Hence, we assume that 45000 couples were taxed separately in 1960. This corresponds 
well with the increase in the number of units in the tax statistics from 1959 to 1960 of 67509 (from 1 
372 298 to 1 439 807), allowing for some growth in the general population in addition to the results of 
the tax law change. With no further data, we use a linear interpolation for the number of separately 
taxed between 1960 and 1967.  
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The approach adopted to transform the data from 1960 to 1966 is as follows: 
• Construct a file of the 1967 population that corresponds to the tabular definitions from 
1960 onwards. That is, merge married couples into one unit with income = (husband's 
income + wife's income) only if they are jointly taxed. If they are separately taxed, 
keep them as two units. Separate taxation usually takes place if both spouses have 
non-neglible incomes. In the file, each unit can be either 
o An unmarried (or widowed, etc) man 
o An unmarried (or widowed, etc) woman 
o A married couple with joint taxation (where at least one spouse is marked as 
not filing separately) 
o A married man with separate filing (whose wife also files separately) 
o A married woman with separate filing (whose husband also files separately) 
• Divide this population into 100 percentiles, sorted by income. 
• For each percentile, calculate 
o The share of units that is a married man with separate filing 
o The share of units that is a married woman with separate filing 
o Among units that are married men with separate filings, the income share of 
the husband in the marriage (ie (income of husband / (income of hus-
band+income of wife)) 
These shares (from now on interpreted as probabilities contingent on income percentile) are shown in 
Figure A 4. 
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Figure A 4: Prevalence of separate taxation in 1967, by income percentile 
 
 
We now apply the transformation to each of the years 1960 to 1966 (year t) as follows: 
• Adjust the "is husband" and "is wife" probabilities down by the factor (number of sep-
arately taxed couples in t)/(number of separately taxed couples in 1967) 
• Divide the tabular population of year t into 100 percentiles, sorted by income. (Many 
of the percentiles will have equal incomes, as the tables have less than 100 categories. 
This is not a problem.) 
• Divide each percentile group, with a given mean income y and population N, into 
three groups: 
o Separately taxed husbands: N*(probabilitiy of being separately taxed hus-
band). We return to this group below 
o Separately taxed wives: N*(probability of being separately taxed wife). We de-
lete these observations as we want to consider them together with their hus-
bands 
o The remaining population N*(the sum of the two above probabilities) are ei-
ther single individuals or jointly taxed couples and are left as is. 
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• For the separately taxed husbands, divide their income by the mean share of separately 
taxed husbands in the percentile. As we divide by a number between 0 and 1, these in-
comes are inflated. This step converts the separately taxed husband's incomes into 
couples' incomes. 
• Finally, re-group the observations into 100 percentiles again. We will now have a 
smaller population as we have created "pseudo-couples" that closely resemble couples 
in the underlying population. 
For 1967, the procedure gives near-perfect results. For earlier years, we cannot test the procedure 
directly, however, the sum of the imputed incomes are very close to the sums of original incomes 
(largest difference is 0.6 %), which is a sign that the interpolation is relatively precise. 
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Appendix F: Within-group distributions 
The Gini coefficients discussed in the main paper are not dependent on assumptions on within-group 
inequality per se. Rather, they can be construed (in the years where there is no data on within-group 
dispersion) as interpolations based on within-group Gini coefficients. However, in some cases it is 
desirable to draw Lorenz curves for illustrative purposes or to estimate other inequality measures 
beside the Gini coefficient. In these cases, the following within-group distributions are one example of 
function forms that are consistent with the within-group Gini coefficients. Moreover, the calculations 
here verify that the within-group Gini coefficients are consistent across groups, that is, that the lowest-
income individuals in the higher groups do not have lower incomes than the highest-income 
individuals in poorer groups. 
CG group (highest incomes) 
For the three-group case, consider a Pareto distribution for the CG group with the probability density 
function  
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦) = 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑦𝑦𝛼𝛼−1
 
 
with mean income 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼−1
 and lower bound d. We set the parameter d to make the mean correspond to the 
mean income of the CG group, 𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (1 − 𝑔𝑔)/𝑐𝑐. This gives 
𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼 − 1
𝛼𝛼
𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
 
The within-group Gini coefficient of the GC group is 
𝐺𝐺∗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 12𝛼𝛼 − 1 
Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) provide values of the Pareto coefficient 𝛼𝛼 for the relevant period (1892-
1903 and 1948-1951), which corresponds to within-group Gini coefficients between 0.33 and 0.5. 
MUN-CG groups 
For the individuals who pay municipal tax but not state tax, we use a uniform distribution with 
probability density function 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦) = 1
𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎
,𝑦𝑦 ∈ [𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏] 
 
with mean income 𝜇𝜇 = (𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏)/2, lower bound a and upper bound b.  
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The Lorenz curve for a uniformly distributed population is  
𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹) =  1
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 �(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎)𝐹𝐹2 + 2𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹� 
 
and the corresponding Gini coefficient is 
𝐺𝐺∗ = 1 − 2� 𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹1
0
= 13 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 
 
For our purposes, it is convenient to rephrase the uniform distribution using the mean m and a spread 
parameter z giving the relative distance of the lower and upper bound from the mean: 𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝑧𝑧)𝜇𝜇 
and 𝑏𝑏 = (1 + 𝑧𝑧)𝜇𝜇. This gives a Gini coefficient of 3G z∗∗ = . 
 
To respect the assumption that the highest-income individual in the MUN-CG group should not have 
higher income than the lowest-income individual in the CG group, 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 must be lower than or 
equal to 𝑑𝑑. Using the known means and inserting for the above equations, we get (1 + 𝑧𝑧𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) ≤ 𝛼𝛼 − 1
𝛼𝛼
𝜇𝜇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜇𝜇𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
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Appendix G: Adjustments for years before 1892 
Before 1892, some special adjustments are made, as no state tax was collected in this period. We do 
have the total number of poor and their total support, from which we get the mean income of the poor. 
For the NA/NT group, we use the income of the poor (85 NOK in 1875 and 76 NOK in 1888) for the 
upper bound Gini and 150 NOK as the upper bound Gini. We take the lowest income group in the 
tabulations, which contains 74 per cent of tabulated individuals in 1875 and 86 per cent of tabulated 
individuals in 1888, and treat these similarly to the MUN-CG groups in 1892 and thereafter. The 
remaining 26 and 14 per cent are treated similarly to the CG groups in later years, and the G* for these 
years are estimated on this population, with incomes above 400 NOK (in 1875) and 1000 NOK (in 
1888). 
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